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# ***JPRS Report***

# **Proliferation Issues**

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# PROLIFERATION ISSUES

JPRS-TND-92-027

## CONTENTS

5 August 1992

[This report contains foreign media information on issues related to worldwide proliferation and transfer activities in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, including delivery systems and the transfer of weapons-relevant technologies.]

### EAST ASIA

#### JAPAN

Russia To Cooperate on Nuclear-Powered Vessels [KYODO] .....	1
IAEA Scale To Measure Nuclear Accidents [KYODO] .....	1

#### NORTH KOREA

Commentary Opposes U.S. Posture in South [Pyongyang Radio] .....	1
Commentary on U.S. Hearings on Inspections [Pyongyang Radio] .....	2
Envoy to Austria Comments on IAEA Inspection [KCNA] .....	2
South Reportedly Accelerating Arms Buildup [KCNA] .....	3
Daily Urges Full Inspection [Pyongyang Radio] .....	3
Japanese Transport of Plutonium Opposed [KCNA] .....	4

#### NEW ZEALAND

Premier Opposes Future French Nuclear Tests [Hong Kong AFP] .....	4
---	---

#### THAILAND

Japan Aids in Relocation of Nuclear Facilities [BANGKOK POST 29 Jul] .....	5
--	---

### NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA

#### EGYPT

Elimination of Mass-Destruction Weapons Urged [MENA] .....	6
--	---

#### INDIA

U.S.-Indian Disarmament Talks Reported [THE HINDU 20 Jun] .....	6
Minister Says Willing To Sign CW Convention [ISI] .....	6
Pilot Power Plant Based on Uranium-233 Built [Delhi Radio] .....	7

#### IRAN

Russian Minister Denies Arms Sales to Iran [IRNA] .....	7
Velayati Denies Nuclear Weapons Development [Tehran Radio] .....	7
Reports of Nuclear Arsenal Termed 'Propaganda' [IRNA] .....	7
UN Envoy Stresses 'Peaceful' Nuclear Program [Tehran Radio] .....	8
German Company Fails To Build Nuclear Plant .....	8
Completion Urged [IRNA] .....	8
Black-Listing Threatened [IRNA] .....	9
Official Foresees No More Excuses [Tehran Radio] .....	9

#### IRAQ

UN Finds Nothing in Agriculture Ministry [Paris AFP] .....	9
--	---

## ISRAEL

Experts Urge Signing CW Treaty By Year's End [HA'ARETZ 30 Jul]	10
Analysis of Nuclear First-Strike Doctrine [YEDI'OT AHARONOT 12 Jul]	10

## PAKISTAN

NPT Signing Conditioned on India's Signing [THE PAKISTAN TIMES 1 Aug]	11
Sharif Speaks of Lasting Nuclear-Free Region [Islamabad Radio]	12
China Provides Nuclear Plant Under Agreement	12
Editorial Praises Delivery [JANG 29 Jun]	12
Work on Plant Begins [THE FRONTIER POST 31 Jul]	12
Paper Calls For Renewed Nuclear Research [THE MUSLIM 3 Aug]	13

## CENTRAL EURASIA

Strategic Missile Commander on Nuclear Ownership [Moscow Radio]	14
Russia, U.S. Reach Accord on Stockpiled CW [Moscow Radio]	14
Russian Foreign Ministry on ABM Treaty [INTERFAX]	15
Russia's Nazarkin on Strategic Arms Reduction [ITAR-TASS]	15
Russia, Japan Cooperate on Nuclear-Powered Ships [ITAR-TASS]	15
Russia, UK Sign Nonproliferation Agreement [IZVESTIYA 29 Jul]	16
Russia, France Sign Space Research Project [INTERFAX]	16
Russia, Ukraine Sign Black Sea Fleet Accord	17
Yeltsin Addresses News Conference [ITAR-TASS]	17
Joint Command Noted [ITAR-TASS]	17
Agreement Called 'Well-Balanced' [ITAR-TASS]	17
Russian General Warns Against More N-Arms Cuts [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 1 Aug]	18
Chemical Weapons Ban Convention Described [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 30 Jul]	18
Problems of Destroying CW Stockpiles [Moscow Radio]	19
Russian Prospects for Technology Exports [MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA No 6, Jun]	19
Russian Experts Assess Nuclear Power Station [Moscow TV]	26
Atomic Submarines To Leave Sovetskaya Gavan [Moscow TV]	26
Feature on Weapons Trade, Discarded Submarines [INTERFAX]	26
Utilization of Scrapped Warships Stepped Up [INTERFAX]	27
Komi Region Views Draft Law on Nuclear Testing [ITAR-TASS]	27
Byelarus To Sell Only Non-Nuclear Weapons [Moscow Radio]	28
Pakistani Professor To Head Baku Science Institute [TURAN]	28

## JAPAN

**Russia To Cooperate on Nuclear-Powered Vessels**  
*OW2907043692 Tokyo KYODO in English 0255 GMT 29 Jul 92*

[Text] Tokyo, July 29 KYODO—The Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute, a government-affiliated institution, plans to send engineers of the nuclear-powered ship Mutsu to Russia as part of a joint effort to develop nuclear-powered ships for commercial use, officials said Wednesday.

Two or three Japanese engineers of the Mutsu will receive training in operating reactors of Russian nuclear-powered ships in the Arctic Ocean.

Russian and Japanese engineers will also study the life span of the ships by dismantling the reactor of the nuclear-powered icebreaker Lenin, the first Russian nuclear-powered ship built some 30 years ago.

The institute, an affiliate of the Science and Technology Agency, will dispatch a research team to Russia in September to discuss details of the joint effort with Russia, a country known for its advanced development of nuclear-powered ships.

It is important for Japan to cooperate with Russia on the project as nuclear-powered commercial ships may potentially be in widespread use by the early part of the 21st century, the institute said.

The 8,242-ton Mutsu, which was Japan's only nuclear-powered ship, was put out of commission in January. Japan has no immediate plan to develop its next nuclear-powered vessel.

**IAEA Scale To Measure Nuclear Accidents**  
*OW3107111992 Tokyo KYODO in English 1047 GMT 31 Jul 92*

[Text] Tokyo, July 31 KYODO—The Agency of Natural Resources and Energy said Friday it will begin using an international scale, rather than a stricter Japanese scale, to measure nuclear accidents, beginning Saturday.

The international scale in question is the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) set by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), agency officials said.

The Science and Technology Agency, which has nuclear reactors for research, has also decided to adopt the INES, the officials said.

The INES, designed to assess accidents at nuclear power stations worldwide by common measures, was introduced in April, they said.

The Japanese scale assesses the dangerousness of nuclear reactor accidents by dividing them into nine ranks, they said.

The INES uses eight levels to measure the dangerousness, which means the scale is less precise than Japan's, they said.

Japan will effectively use nine levels as it is used to, by dividing the INES's "level zero" further into two levels, "level zero plus" and "level zero minus," they said.

Under the INES levels in 89 cases of past nuclear accidents in Japan will be lowered by one or two ranks, however, they said.

Currently, more than 30 nations, including European nations, India, and South Korea, have decided to use the INES, according to the agency.

The United States, which owns more reactors than any other nation in the world, has yet to decide on adopting the INES, however, the officials said.

## NORTH KOREA

**Commentary Opposes U.S. Posture in South**  
*SK3007130792 Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network in Korean 1150 GMT 27 Jul 92*

[Commentary by station commentator Chong Pong-kil: "The Cold War Way of Thinking Should Be Discarded"]

[Excerpt] Out-of-the-ordinary remarks are being heard these days from bellicose U.S. circles. RisCassi, commander of the U.S. imperialist aggression forces in South Korea, in an interview with DEFENSE NEWS, raved that even if the North succeeds in developing nuclear weapons, South Korea will be given protection by the U.S. nuclear umbrella. He said there is no need for any change in the posture of the U.S. forces in South Korea.

Earlier on 24 July, a so-called report on the post cold war direction of U.S. foreign policy was issued incorporating the opinions of 21 foreign policy, economic, and defense experts. In the report, they stressed someone's dangerous nature and that the United States should maintain the largest military strength in the world. The report said that the presence of U.S. forces in South Korea is necessary on a short-term basis for Asian security.

This openly reveals their scheme to perpetually occupy South Korea militarily under the pretext of someone's nonexistent threat. It is a vicious challenge to our people and the world's people who consistently desire peace in Korea and its peaceful reunification.

Concerning the remarks of RisCassi, commander of the U.S. imperialist aggression forces in South Korea, on someone's nuclear development, it is an absurd claim that convinces no one and a sophistry aimed at justifying their occupation of South Korea.

As everyone knows, we have repeatedly proclaimed that we have neither the ability nor the intention to develop nuclear weapons. Through the two rounds of nonregular inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency,

it has been confirmed that there are no nuclear weapons in our country but that nuclear materials are used only for peaceful purposes to meet the increasing demand for electricity.

The ringleader in turning South Korea into a U.S. nuclear forward base and in threatening us with nuclear weapons is blaming us. This is a shameless act of a thief turning on the owner.

That RisCassi raved about the U.S. nuclear protective umbrella for South Korea following the U.S. announcement on tactical nuclear weapons withdrawal from South Korea leads us to doubt the announcements credibility all the more and proves that there is no change in U.S. policy toward Korea. [passage omitted]

### Commentary on U.S. Hearings on Inspections

SK3107041192 *Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network in Korean 0025 GMT 31 Jul 92*

[NODONG SINMUN commentary: "The Insidious Scheme Should Be Discarded"]

[Text] In the United States, a so-called joint hearing on North Korea's nuclear project was recently held. Participating in the hearing were some members of the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee Asia-Pacific Subcommittee; Arms Control, International Security, and Science Subcommittee; and International Economic Policy and Trade Subcommittee.

In the hearing, some U.S. congressmen said that they cannot trust the result of the fair inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]. Raving about the limitations of the IAEA inspections, they stressed that a special inspection, challenge inspection [tojon sachal], and surprise inspection [kisup sachal] should be applied to us. Solarz, again, led the criticism against us, saying that he is very seriously worried about North Korea's nuclear development.

It is well known that people from some U.S. circles, including Solarz, rave about our nuclear development and are persistently attempting to create nuclear suspicion [haek uihok]. Needless to say, the aforesaid hearing is another such attempt. Here we note that those who attempted to arouse nuclear suspicion against us are very perplexed at the proven openness and innocence [kyol-baeksong] of our nuclear project.

As has been reported, we have been receiving the IAEA inspections according to the Nuclear Safeguards Accord. The second nonregular inspection was recently conducted by the IAEA. We have been cooperating with all sincerity with the IAEA so that it can successfully carry out its inspection task. Hans Blix, IAEA director general, invited to the hearing, openly stated that we were cooperative with the inspections.

It has been indisputably confirmed to the world that we are using nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes and

that we have been making every sincere effort for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. It has also been thoroughly revealed how absurd is the false propaganda conducted by some U.S. circles aimed at creating nuclear suspicion against us. They are irritated; therefore, they hurriedly held a so-called hearing and made commotions in an attempt to relight the dying ember of nuclear suspicion again. Acting as if they were the only people opposed to nuclear threat, they viciously criticize others' peaceful nuclear projects, mentioning nothing about the nuclear threat created on the Korean peninsula by the United States. Furthermore, even at this time, after the announced withdrawal of nuclear weapons from South Korea, they are having the South Korean authorities oppose an all-out inspection of the U.S. nuclear bases and nuclear weapons. The wicked scheme of those who participated in the hearing is to make an issue of the North's nuclear development by all means to criticize our peaceful nuclear project so as to pressure the IAEA to apply special inspection, challenge inspection, and surprise inspection on us. For this, they are frantically publicizing the North's so-called nuclear development in an attempt to convince the world of the nuclear suspicion against us. Disbelieving even the IAEA's inspection system, they are not hesitating to defile the IAEA's authority and dignity.

Those who have insidious and wicked schemes are ready to do anything. It will be a wild fancy if they think it will work, however. Pressure is far from being a way to solve a problem, and justice will always triumph over injustice. We once again urge some circles of the United States not to try to hamper others' concerns that are going well but to behave themselves. Those who doubt the principled position of our Republic, which intends to be faithful to its duty according to international law stipulated by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty by using nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes, will be strongly denounced and entombed by our people and the world's peace-loving people.

### Envoy to Austria Comments on IAEA Inspection

SK0108060192 *Pyongyang KCNA in English 0420 GMT 1 Aug 92*

[Text] Pyongyang August 1 (KCNA)—We are interested in strengthening the inspection system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and will do all we can to this end, said Korean Ambassador to Austria Pak Si-ung at a recent press conference in Vienna, referring to the two rounds of successful irregular nuclear inspection by the IAEA.

He said the IAEA's inspection system is the only internationally recognized one for nuclear non-proliferation.

He expressed regret at the fact that some Western politicians at international meetings voiced apprehensions for the DPRK's "nuclear development program" and let out words casting a shadow over the role of the

inspection system of the IAEA, contending that "an effective mutual inspection system should be put into practice" in Korea.

Noting that the IAEA's inspection system is one that applies to all the member nations under the international treaty, he stressed once again that the DPRK would thoroughly fulfil its obligations under the safeguards accord in the future, too, and actively cooperate with the IAEA in it.

### **South Reportedly Accelerating Arms Buildup**

*SK2407114892 Pyongyang KCNA in English  
1002 GMT 24 Jul 92*

[Text] Pyongyang July 24 (KCNA)—The South Korean authorities imported military equipment worth 3.1 billion dollars from the United States in 1991, a foreign press report from Washington said.

They purchased military equipment worth 1,605 million dollars from the U.S. in 1990.

In 1991, they concluded a contract with the U.S. to import 120 F-16 fighter-bombers worth 5.2 billion dollars between 1994 and 1997. They made a contract with a French firm to purchase Mistral missiles worth 1 billion francs last January.

As is known, the removal of military confrontation and the adoption of a North-South nonaggression declaration were discussed as pending issues at the inter-Korean high-level talks which started in September 1990. As a result, the historic inter-Korean agreement was effectuated at the sixth round of talks last February.

The South Korean authorities discussed the issues of military confidence building and disarmament with the North and signed a relevant document of agreement at the inter-Korean high-level talks. But they have accelerated arms buildup behind the scene. This shows they are not interested in peaceful reunification.

### **Daily Urges Full Inspection**

*SK2407120292 Pyongyang Korean Central  
Broadcasting Network in Korean 0025 GMT 23 Jul 92*

[NODONG SINMUN commentary: "The South Side Is Responsible"]

[Text] The seventh North-South Joint Nuclear Control Committee [JNCC] meeting, which took place in our side's area of Panmunjom on 21 July, failed to make progress because of the South side's unjust and insincere attitude. The meeting attracted attention from home and abroad, however, because important facts were disclosed by the South side's attitude. The South side admitted that the declaration, which the South side has propagandized at home and abroad, was false and that the South side is fully responsible for the delayed discussions of

issues for implementing the joint denuclearization declaration, principally because of its policy of relying on outside forces.

This is clearly proven by the fact that when our side asked the South side to state which was true—a recent U.S. announcement that it has withdrawn its nuclear weapons from South Korea or the South Korean ruler's declaration that there are no nuclear weapons—the South side refrained from answering the question. The South Korean ruler issued the so-called denuclearization declaration last December, but the United States, the owner of the nuclear weapons in South Korea, kept silent until 2 July. On that day, more than half a year after the declaration, the United States officially announced that it had withdrawn all tactical nuclear weapons from Europe and Asia. It also announced later that it had withdrawn its nuclear weapons from South Korea. The U.S. announcement has again proven that the South Korean chief executive's declaration was false. At a U.S. Congressional hearing last March, Ruscassi, commander of the U.S. forces in South Korea, refused to say whether there are nuclear weapons in South Korea. At about the same time, the existence of secret U.S. nuclear weapons depots in South Korea was disclosed by one of the people who built them.

Our side said at the seventh North-South JNCC meeting: Bush has said that the United States has withdrawn all tactical nuclear weapons from Europe and Asia. In that case, what types of nuclear weapons did the United States withdraw from South Korea? How many? And when?

The South side's delegate groaned agonizingly and could not answer. All this shows that the South Korean chief executive's denuclearization declaration was false and they have concealed the U.S. nuclear weapons in violation of the joint denuclearization declaration. What is grave is that they, after being dumbfounded and at a loss for a while, unhesitatingly stated that they follow the U.S. policy of neither confirming nor denying the existence of nuclear weapons and that South Korea is still under the jurisdiction of this policy. The South side clearly showed that even though the North and South had promised before the nation that they would peacefully reunify the country without fighting each other, the South side has yet to abandon its vicious intention to pursue division and confrontation with outside forces based on the policy of strength. In this way, it also admitted that even today, when the world is walking along the road of independence and peace, the South Korean authorities are still a regime subjugated to the United States, a regime that is playing the role of a U.S. henchman after turning South Korea into a U.S. colony.

The South side's shameful gibberish is tantamount to the official declaration that it would not achieve denuclearization. This clearly shows how far its unchanging idea of relying on outside forces has gone. It has now become clear why the South side, after coming to the JNCC

meetings without bringing a draft supplementary agreement, has so resolutely opposed the inspection of the U.S. nuclear bases and nuclear weapons in South Korea.

The South side presented what is called a draft supplementary agreement, though nominal and insubstantial, at the meeting, but this was nothing but an admission that the South side is responsible for the delayed discussions of issues at the JNCC meetings. At a time when the propaganda that there are no nuclear weapons has been proven false and when it has become clear who was responsible for the lack of progress, the South side must repent its insidious act of running counter to the era and hold a serious dialogue with us to denuclearize the Korean peninsula.

What is important is for the South side to abandon its confrontational concept and anachronistic idea of casting away national independence and trying to gain something by following outside force. Because the United States announced that it has withdrawn its nuclear weapons from South Korea, the South Korean authorities must not turn a blind eye to a full inspection of those nuclear weapons and accept our fair and above-board draft rules of inspection without delay. The future of a solution to the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula fully depends on the South side's attitude.

#### **Japanese Transport of Plutonium Opposed**

*SK0308052892 Pyongyang KCNA in English  
0453 GMT 3 Aug 92*

[Text] Pyongyang August 3 (KCNA)—A spokesman of the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea Sunday answered a question put by KCNA about Japan's plan to carry by ship large quantities of plutonium from Britain and France.

No one can be assured of the safety of the Japanese ship which will have to make a long voyage, loaded with large quantities of plutonium, he said and went on: The dangerous scheme of Japan to carry plutonium through a sea route may be a source of an awful calamity to many countries, to our country separated from Japan by a sea and her other neighbours in Asia.

While producing no small amount of plutonium at home, Japan is going to introduce large quantities of it in an adventurous way and stockpile it. This can hardly be regarded as a move simply intended for a peaceful nuclear energy program.

It cannot be construed otherwise than part of the program for the nuclear armament of Japan and her conversion into a military power.

It is an open secret that today the nuclear armament of Japan has reached a very dangerous phase.

Japan should not talk about "suspicion of nuclear development" against others but give up her sinister program of nuclear armament quickly.

We consider that the peoples of Asia and rest of the world should do all they can to curb the adventurous plan of Japan to transport by ship and stockpile large quantities of plutonium.

## **NEW ZEALAND**

### **Premier Opposes Future French Nuclear Tests**

*BK0308075892 Hong Kong AFP in English 0728 GMT  
3 Aug 92*

[Text] Wellington, Aug 3 (AFP)—Any resumption of French nuclear tests at Mururoa Atoll will make South Pacific nations angry, Prime Minister Jim Bolger told a news conference Monday.

"They will see it as the arrogance of a distant power, that is how it will be interpreted."

France suspended its 1992 nuclear testing programme saying it would reconsider the 1993 programme after it had seen the response of other nuclear powers.

Over the weekend Jean Lichere, head of the military applications section of France's Atomic Energy Commission, suggested in an interview the tests might resume.

Bolger said Foreign Minister Don McKinnon had written to French Ambassador Gabriel de Bellescize over the issue.

Bolger said McKinnon had expressed "our concern if the French Government was to take the advice of its military, which appears to be where it is coming from, that they should recommence testing in the Pacific."

He said New Zealand and the South Pacific Forum could see "absolutely no justification" for testing to resume.

"In fact, at a time in the world history when the major powers are seeking, and have successfully sought, to reduce the number of nuclear weapons, there seems to be absolutely no justification to go back to nuclear testing."

He said he had received no direct indication from Paris that testing would resume, but said "it seems to be a rumour that is gaining some momentum."

"We want to make certain there was no doubt whatsoever as to the view of the New Zealand Government which certainly also reflects the view of the Pacific island nations."

In a statement McKinnon said he had received no confirmation that the reports on a possible resumption represented official policy.

## THAILAND

### Japan Aids in Relocation of Nuclear Facilities

*BK2907042992 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English  
29 Jul 92 p 3*

[Text] A six-member delegation from the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum (JAIF) yesterday held talks with Thailand's Office of Atomic Energy for Peace (OAEP) on a plan to update and relocate OAEP's nuclear facilities.

In a telephone interview, Tatsuo Aoki, general manager of JAIF's International Nuclear Cooperation Centre, said from Tokyo that OAEP had sought "technical advice" from JAIF on its plan to relocate its nuclear facilities.

"The facilities are for research purposes," he said, such as for the production of radio isotopes for medical use.

Mr Aoki added that the facilities may also be used in the research of nuclear activation analysis, but it depends on OAEP.

He denied the reactor would be used for experimental electricity generation.

The mass circulation MAINICHI SHIMBUN recently reported that JAIF was making preparations to export a nuclear reactor to Thailand, based on the JRR-3, which was developed by the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute as a nuclear research vehicle with an output of 20,000 kilowatts.

It also reported that the JAIF delegation, headed by Dr An Shigehiro and including technical experts from Hitachi Ltd and NKK, the company that built the JRR-3, was expected to present to Thai officials conceptual diagrams of a version of the JRR-3 able to produce 5,000 kilowatts of power.

If Japan is awarded the contract, it would conclude legal documents required for the sale of the reactor. Construction would take two or three years, and would begin in the second half of 1993.

In his telephone interview, Mr Aoki said the talks were aimed solely at "technical advice for the time being," however, and the prospect of selling a nuclear reactor would be discussed later.

Contacted yesterday, the information division of OAEP said further details would be available today.

Meanwhile, the Thai News Agency quoted OAEP secretary-general Suchat Mongkhonphan as saying on Saturday that his office had plans for a "new site for the office's nuclear facilities" in Tambon Saimun, Ongkharak District, Nakhon Nayok Province.

He said some 150 community leaders and representatives were invited to visit the OAEP facilities on Wiphawadi Rangsit Road.

OAEP experts visited the community last June to explain the project.

JAIF is a non-profit organisation comprising some 800 companies, mainly nuclear component manufacturers, electric utilities and research and development organisations.



## EGYPT

### Elimination of Mass-Destruction Weapons Urged

NC0108094392 Cairo MENA in Arabic 2106 GMT  
31 Jul 92

[Text] Cairo, 31 Jul (MENA)—Egypt has emphasized the need to remove all types of mass-destruction weapons and for every country to comply with this measure before signing the draft international (?agreement) on the elimination of chemical weapons, recently endorsed by the Geneva conference on eliminating chemical weapons.

In statements to the newspaper AL-AHRAM to be published on Saturday, Naji al-Ghatrifi, official spokesman of the Foreign Ministry, said it is not sensible for a country or group of countries to be deprived of a particular type of mass-destruction weapon, research into it, or production, while one Middle East country is the only one to possess another type.

He added that Egypt's stand on the need to free the Middle East of all types of mass-destruction weapons stems from this principle.

He noted that what applies to (?every regional country) on mass-destruction weapons also applies to Israel, because it, too, is in the region.

Commenting on the outcome of the Geneva conference, he said that, to be fair, there should be no distinction among the various types of mass-destruction weapons and no type should have priority over another.

The Geneva conference endorsed a draft international agreement to ban the proliferation of chemical weapons and to eliminate them in 10 (?years).

The agreement is expected to be signed at a conference in Paris in January in the presence of several heads of state.

## INDIA

### U.S.-Indian Disarmament Talks Reported

92WP0268 Madras THE HINDU in English 20 Jun 92  
p 1

[Text] New Delhi, June 19—The two-day Indo-U.S. dialogue on "disarmament related issues" ended here today with the stress on security in Asia and the Asia-Pacific.

While official sources here declined to reveal details of the discussions, certain inferences on what transpired can be drawn. According to informed sources, proceedings at Tuesday's bilateral meet here helped to bring out the differences between U.S. and Pakistani concepts about a five-nation conference on regional security.

The concept of the five-nation regional conference on South Asia—an idea which the United States had actively supported in the recent past—was referred to only in passing.

However, during the two-day talks, India did not encourage the U.S. proposal but did not reject it either. Sources here said that "at this point of time" New Delhi does not favour such a multi-lateral dialogue but desires that the process of bilateral discussion continues.

Stand on NPT [Nonproliferation Treaty] restated: On NPT, the U.S. once again expressed its desire that India becomes its signatory but India reiterated its stand against signing the regime. India, on a number of occasions has rejected the NPT, arguing that it is a discriminatory regime which freezes the status quo between the nuclear haves and have-nots.

In response to U.S. objections on India's missile programme and defence spending, India highlighted its threat perception in a broader Asian context. In the context of the missile programme, India is said to have argued that its missile programme is only a response to the presence of these weapons around a zone which is of concern to its security.

Sanctions against ISRO [Indian Space Research Organization]: Informed sources here also said that discussions on U.S. sanctions on the ISRO did take place, but the two sides decided that the issue be discussed separately and in all its dimensions.

### Minister Says Willing To Sign CW Convention

BK0308153892 Delhi ISI Diplomatic Information  
Service in English 1452 GMT 3 Aug 92

["Spokesman on Signing of Chemical Weapons Convention by India: dated 31-7-92"—ISI headline]

[Text] In response to a question regarding a news item which appeared in certain sections of the press in which it has been reported that the minister of state for external affairs, Eduardo Faleiro, has said that India is willing to sign the proposed chemical weapons convention, the spokesman clarified that the report conveys a slightly incomplete picture. He referred to one of his earlier press briefings in which he has stated that India has certain reservations about the treaty.

The spokesman said that the real point is that the chemical weapons convention is subject of intensive negotiations in the conference on disarmament in Geneva at the present time. As yet the adhoc committee has not taken a decision on the final shape of the CW [chemical weapons] convention. Present negotiations, in which we are playing a very active role, relate precisely to some of the concerns which were indicated to press in one of earlier briefings, after the visit of the Federal German Commissioner Holik's visit to India, in early July this year. The minister of state also mentioned some of these concerns yesterday. He said, for example, that

developing countries believe that if they were to accede to the CW convention, and accept a verification regime that is envisaged under the CW convention, their access to chemical equipment and technology for purposes not prohibited by the convention should not be subjected to additional restraints such as those existing in the form of adhoc export control regimes. India's commitment to a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons through an agreement is well known. It is in this spirit that India has always expressed the willingness to sign the CW convention, but, it must fulfill these criteria. Criteria and difficulties that we still see in certain aspects of the convention are precisely subject of negotiations today in Geneva. We hope that these negotiations will result in a satisfactory treaty, which it is our long declared intention to become signatories to. We hope that as a result of these negotiations we will be able to negotiate a satisfactory treaty which will enjoy universal adherence.

#### **Pilot Power Plant Based on Uranium-233 Built**

*BK2907162092 Delhi All India Radio Network  
in English 1530 GMT 29 Jul 92*

[Text] A pilot power plant based on Uranium-233 has been built by the Bhaba Atomic Research Center. The minister of state for science and technology, Mr. Kuma-rangalam, told the Lok Sabha today that Uranium-233 is not commercially produced in the country as yet. But research and development for utilization of thorium is being pursued. He said part of the thorium can be converted into Uranium-233 in a nuclear reactor. The minister said nuclear power from Uranium-233 can be economical.

### **IRAN**

#### **Russian Minister Denies Arms Sales to Iran**

*LD3007141392 Tehran IRNA in English 1336 GMT  
30 Jul 92*

[Text] Moscow, July 30, IRNA—Moscow Thursday denied reports published by Western press on Russia's arms sale to Iran.

The first channel of the Russian Television in its Thursday newscast quoting head of the Military and Technical Cooperation Department of the Ministry of Foreign Trade Relations, denied a report carried by the French LE MONDE newspaper regarding sale of airplanes and other military ammunitions to Iran.

On the eve of the visit to Tehran of the Russian Minister of Foreign Trade Relations Pyoter Aven, Moscow-based newspapers have published various articles over the past three days on Russia's sale of armaments to Iran quoting Western newspapers.

Denying the reports, several Russian economic and military authorities claimed that the articles published by "rivals" are aimed at checking Moscow's influence in arms markets of the Persian Gulf region.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, published in Moscow, in an article Wednesday claimed that Moscow losing several of its major arms customers including Iraq, had sold arms worth 4.8 billion dollars to Iran.

The paper said that Moscow had not supplied Iran with any ammunition between 1984 and 1987 but has sold 4.8 billion dollars worth of various military ammunition, including aircraft, tanks and submarines afterwards.

LE MONDE claimed in an article that Russia has sold some arms to Iran and intends to supply it with another 110 military aircraft.

#### **Velayati Denies Nuclear Weapons Development**

*LD0108210992 Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of  
Iran in English 1830 GMT 1 Aug 92*

[Text] The Islamic Republic of Iran's foreign minister, Dr. 'Ali Akbar Velayati, said yesterday: Iran has no interest in developing nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. In an interview in Tehran with the German (?reputed) daily FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, in response to a question that the Western intelligence services have estimated that Iran will be able to test its nuclear weapons by the end of the current decade, Dr. Velayati said: I categorically deny this claim that Iran is developing nuclear weapons. He added: Our answer about the development of chemical and biological weapons is also negative.

In referring to the former Soviet Union, Velayati said: Some countries which have been nuclear powers are now demanding money from the West to demolish their nuclear arsenals. Velayati added: Therefore it is a foolish policy for some countries that are still seeking nuclear weapons [as heard].

#### **Reports of Nuclear Arsenal Termed 'Propaganda'**

*LD0308102392 Tehran IRNA in English 0828 GMT  
3 Aug 92*

[Text] Tehran, Aug. 3, IRNA—An English daily Monday commented on the propaganda campaigns on Iran's developing nuclear, chemical or biological weapons saying that they were aimed at justifying possession of these arms by the Zionist regime and forcing the Persian Gulf states to enter into military pacts with the U.S.

In its editorial the 'TEHRAN TIMES' said that certain countries, notably the United States and especially the pro-Zionist elements in the U.S. Administration make ballyhoo every now and then on this topic.

The propaganda is launched despite the fact that experts from the International Atomic Energy Agency who inspected Iranian centers deny that Iran is planning to acquire nuclear weapons.

Iranian officials have reiterated on various occasions that Tehran is not interested in developing these arms.

The propaganda is aimed at "scaring Iran's neighbors, especially the Persian Gulf littoral states, preventing the establishment of friendly ties between Iran and these countries and encouraging them to enter into military pacts with the U.S."

They also want to justify the illegal presence of alien forces in the Persian Gulf under the pretext of preserving safety of commercial navigation.

It mentioned "diverting the psychological security concerns of the Middle Eastern Arab countries away from the danger posed by Israel, and making these countries focus their attention on Iran" as another goal of the propaganda campaigns.

The propaganda is also aimed at justifying the Zionist regime's possession of nuclear weapons "by implying that Israel is not the only country in the region which possesses such weapons."

"Intimidating some of the new republics in the former Soviet Union, preventing any kind of rapprochement between these countries and Iran," should be added to the list of objectives mentioned by the paper.

The editorial as an example mentioned that whenever there is talk of expansion of Iran's ties with the Kazakh or Ukraine Republics, the Western propaganda loud-speakers spread rumors that these republics are planning to sell nuclear technology to Iran.

"To complete the propaganda plot, there is the possibility that Israel might be tempted to engage in military adventurism against Iran, similar to the operation it undertook against Iraq in the early 80s."

The daily stressed that Iran should be ready to retaliate properly "if the Zionist regime were to make such a blunder."

#### UN Envoy Stresses 'Peaceful' Nuclear Program

NC0108072292 *Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network in Persian 0330 GMT 1 Aug 92*

[Text] Iran's permanent UN Representative Kamal Kharrazi spoke to the U.S. television network ABC about reports on Iran's military-nuclear research and said: All of Iran's nuclear programs are peaceful.

During this interview, also attended by a MIDDLE EAST DEFENSE NEWS correspondent and a U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee representative, Kharrazi said: The advanced technology Iran has purchased has been used in overt non-military projects. The International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] can inspect Iran's installations whenever it wishes.

The MIDDLE EAST DEFENSE NEWS correspondent had claimed that Iran has made great progress in nuclear technology [not further specified].

The ABC correspondent said at the end of the interview that after its inspection of Iran's nuclear research centers, the IAEA had found no evidence of a military nuclear program.

#### German Company Fails To Build Nuclear Plant

##### Completion Urged

LD0108212392 *Tehran IRNA in English 1412 GMT 1 Aug 92*

[Text] Tehran, Aug. 1, IRNA—A morning daily Saturday blamed German officials for claiming to be concerned about human rights while ignoring such rights as far as the Iranians are concerned.

"JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI" commented on the Saturday visit to Iran of a high-ranking economic delegation from the German Siemens company which is bound to complete Bushehr atomic power plant in southern Iran.

The 7.8 billion-mark contract for the establishment of the plant was signed between Iran's Atomic Energy Organization and the German Kraftwerk Union (KWU) in 1976. The contractor is now Siemens.

The paper argued whether it is not an anti-humanistic measure to deprive the Iranians of the right to benefit from the energy of a power plant the cost of which has almost been paid by them.

According to the agreement, the German side undertook to build and complete the plant in an area 18 Kms southwest of the Persian Gulf littoral province of Bushehr.

The contractor also undertook to provide the fuel needed by the complex and agreed to deliver it in 1980-81. The figure demanded for fuel was put at over dlr. 155 million.

So far, Iran has paid about 5.8 billion German marks of the total cost of the plant and over 137 million marks for the fuel.

Upon the victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 the contractor terminated the contract and its auxiliary agreements, and later contractors of the said agreements filed complaints against Iran at international tribunals.

Stressing that after spending billions of marks by Iran what has so far been built in Bushehr is nothing but a "historical monument", the paper expressed hope that Siemens will feel obliged to abide by its commitments towards the plant.

It also hoped that the German Government, in an independent and responsible manner, will make an immediate decision in connection with the completion of the plant so that hardware worth billions of German marks would not be wasted.

What makes the case even worse is the uncertain status of some 500 engineers, experts and technicians working for the plant as well as deprivation of over 60 million Iranians of getting access to electricity.

It concluded by urging the KWU and Siemens to observe their undertakings and called on the Iranian officials to pursue the case and insist on the fact that conclusion of any new agreement depends on the performance of such commitments.

#### **Black-Listing Threatened**

*LD0208093692 Tehran IRNA in English 0727 GMT  
2 Aug 92*

[Text] Tehran, Aug. 2, IRNA—A morning daily Sunday urged Iranian officials to include Germany in their 'black list' and refrain from concluding even a 'pennig-worth' contract with it because of Bonn's failure to abide by its commitments to complete Bushehr atomic power plant.

'JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI' commented on the current visit to Iran of a high-ranking delegation from the German company Siemens which is bound to complete the 7.8 billion-mark plant in the Persian Gulf province of Bushehr.

In 1976 a contract was signed between Iran's Atomic Energy Organization and the German Krafts Werck Union for the establishment of the power plant but upon the victory of the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the contractor unilaterally terminated the agreement.

"The Siemens company has so far refrained from performing its undertakings in this connection, each time resorting to unfounded pretexts. Negotiations have proven futile and the outcome has further revealed that Germans are not trustworthy and that their undertakings are not valid."

The article also criticized the trade imbalance between Tehran and Bonn and noted that in 1991 the volume of bilateral trade amounted to 8.2 billion German marks, 6.7 billion marks of which stood for Germany's exports to Iran, more than Bonn's total exports to some 22 Arab countries.

"It is not clear why we should conduct such an immense bulk of trade-industrial transactions with a country which is still imposing severe export restrictions on us."

Arguing that whether the hopes Siemens has placed in Iran would be materialized and if the past records of the German company would all be forgotten, the article noted that time will give the appropriate response.

#### **Official Foresees No More Excuses**

*LD0208112492 Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network in Persian 0930 GMT  
2 Aug 92*

[Text] In an interview with reporters today, the deputy for Iran's Atomic Energy Organization's power plants criticized the German Government or the non-fulfillment of its commitments with regards to the completion of the Bushehr atomic power plant, and, describing the latest situation at that power plant, he said: After the victory of the Islamic revolution, the German Government used various pretexts, such as the imposed war and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, to avoid completing the Bushehr power plant. Although all these problems are over and the German Government has signed two important agreements with Iran about the peaceful use of nuclear energy, however, it still refuses to fulfill its obligations.

He added: In view of the German Government's refusal to fulfill its obligations, what guarantees are there that it will carry out its other commitments and agreements? He said that the reason behind the non-implementation and non-completion of the project was the German Government's fear that Iran would acquire advanced technology, and added: The Bushehr power plant, despite the outcry raised throughout the world, has no military applications.

Our country's Atomic Energy Organization deputy stressed that the Islamic Republic of Iran's goal in the construction of that power plant is the implementation of economic projects and the provision of water and electricity, and said: We have said again and again that the inspectors of the International Atomic Agency can be based at the power plant and the cost of their presence will be borne by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

He went on to say: In view of these issues and the inspections of the Bushehr power plant by the inspectors of the International Atomic Agency, after which they expressed the opinion that it is to be used for peaceful purposes, the German Government has no pretext whatsoever any more to avoid completing the station.

Our country's Atomic Energy Organization deputy added: We will act towards the provision of electricity and the establishment of new power plants using nuclear resources, and we will hold talks with interested countries toward this end. At the moment, we have begun discussions with China about the establishment of new power plants.

#### **IRAQ**

#### **UN Finds Nothing in Agriculture Ministry**

*NC2907092092 Paris AFP in English 0915 GMT  
29 Jul 92*

[Text] Baghdad, July 29 (AFP) - U.N. weapons inspectors found nothing in their search of the agriculture ministry here, team leader Achim Biermann said Wednesday.

He told journalists after the team ended their inspection: "We did not take any materials out of the ministry."

## ISRAEL

### Experts Urge Signing CW Treaty By Year's End

TA3007132092 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew  
30 Jul 92 p A1

[Report by defense affairs correspondent Aluf Ben]

[Excerpts] Israel will sign the international treaty for the prohibition of chemical weapons at the end of 1992, and will put off resolving the political dispute surrounding the treaty to the final endorsement stage, which will last about two years.

This is the recommendation currently being formulated by experts from various government ministries. Their conclusions will be submitted to the political echelon for approval within the next few weeks.

The professional experts believe that Israel has a clear interest in eliminating all chemical weapons in the Middle East, both because of its historical sensitivity to the use of gas in killing human beings, and also because it was actually threatened with the use of such weapons, as proven in the Gulf war.

Israel is now waiting for the final approval of the draft of the chemical weapons nonproliferation treaty by the international disarmament committee in Geneva, which comprises some 40 countries. [passage omitted]

Over the past few months, Israel and the Arab countries have demanded that the other side be the first to sign the treaty. Pressure was exerted on Israel to sign first in order to neutralize the Arabs' demands. This was the most prominent issue on the agenda during German Deputy Foreign Minister Josef Holick's visit to Israel two weeks ago. Germany is in charge of all issues related to the treaty on the prohibition of chemical weapons, within the framework of the International Disarmament Committee. [passage omitted]

### Analysis of Nuclear First-Strike Doctrine

92AE0513Z Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew  
12 Jul 92 p 19

[Article by Shlomo Gazit: "Rabin's Nuclear Challenge"]

[Text] In advance of the establishment of the new government headed by Yitzhaq Rabin, there has been a lot of discussion as to whether he will succeed in putting an end to the cycle of wars and paving the way for an Israeli-Arab political settlement. It is clear to every intelligent person that such an agreement, should it be achieved, would, in the best case, be one that the two sides would adopt with mixed feelings—because of the need to concede physical property (which is so important

to Israel from a security perspective), for emotional-ethical reasons and because of the uncertainty as to whether it would be applicable to the entire process.

The military threats we face involve a number of cycles of time and power. The most distant threat, 10 years off according to the intelligence experts, is also the most dangerous. I am referring to the Muslim-Arab effort to achieve nuclear potential. According to the publications we have at hand, this effort is being conducted in parallel in Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Algeria. The basic assumption is that at least one of them will certainly reach the objective—nuclear weapons—within the stated time frame.

That will happen, if it happens, long after the new government has completed its tenure. But if the next four years are not exploited for a breakthrough, it is doubtful that the next government in line, the one to be established after the 1996 elections, would still be able to achieve the required agreement.

In June 1981 Israeli Air Force planes destroyed the Iraqi Osiraq reactor and thus delayed Saddam Husayn's nuclear development effort by a few years. I am sure the Prime Minister designate knows that Israel cannot carry out that kind of mission again against every one of the above-mentioned states. Operational restrictions and political considerations prevent us in advance from forcefully blocking nuclear weaponry in the Arab-Muslim states.

We must therefore suppose that in the future we will face a new military-strategic balance. Anyone who tries to compare that with the balance of terror that characterized relations between the two great blocs from the 1950's to the 1990's is mixing apples and oranges. In the statistics of the Middle East we are talking about a very serious asymmetry from Israel's point of view.

First, there is no comparison between the destructive potential of Arab nuclear weaponry employed against Israel and the destructive potential in the opposite direction. Israel has no prospect of surviving such a scenario; at best we could "do a Sampson" and "take the Philistines down with us."

Second, it is customary to suppose that Israel would also employ weapons of mass destruction to block and frustrate an Arab conventional attack if the latter were to be stunningly successful. But the application of that idea is by no means simple. Both the Arab side and the international arena would deal with such a reaction according to the geography. A reaction to Arab military success in the territories beyond the 1967 lines would be seen in an entirely different light than a reaction to a strike against the "little" State of Israel.

Third, Israeli use of weapons of mass destruction cannot be considered a solution to an Arab war of attrition or a conventional missile attack on population centers.

Fourth, an Israel that tries to reach a political agreement 10 years from now, after balance has been achieved in the ownership of weapons of mass destruction, will be in a bad bargaining position—without most of the cards that she holds today.

All in all, such asymmetry is unacceptable for Israel. On the other hand, since it seems almost unpreventable, the clear conclusion is that it is better to do it now: We have to strive immediately to reach a political settlement. This is the nuclear challenge, and this is the urgent mission of the new government.

## PAKISTAN

### NPT Signing Conditioned on India's Signing

BK0108113192 Islamabad THE PAKISTAN TIMES  
in English 1 Aug 92 p 10

[Text] Islamabad, July 31—The Federal Minister for Defence Syed Ghous Ali Shah has said that Pakistan is ready to sign a non-proliferation treaty (NPT) provided India does the same.

The Federal Minister was addressing the seminar on nuclear non proliferation—regional approach, at a local hotel here today.

He said that in the absence of such a treaty the countries of the region (South Asia) would continue to remain under constant nuclear threat.

He said the non-proliferation should be of nuclear weapons and not nuclear technology for peaceful applications. The Federal Minister said the policy of denial of technologies to the developing countries who have crossed the technology thresholds would be very damaging for them. He said the question of nuclear non-proliferation should be studied carefully taking into account the needs of developing countries.

He said that regional approach to bringing about nuclear non-proliferation should prove to be quite helpful provided those who possess the technology and perfected it in both peaceful and weapon programmes deal with all countries of the region even-handedly.

The federal minister stressed that pressure should be exerted on the regional country which has demonstrated nuclear weapon capability through denial of advanced technologies and was intending towards further strengthening that programme.

The federal minister observed that the Indian integrated guided missile programme and the second testing of Agni—the 2500 kilometres intermediate range ballistic missile were—destabilizing the region. He also quoted the statement of state department spokesman who said “we believe that ballistic missile programmes in areas where there are chronic regional tensions undermine rather than enhancing regional security”.

He said Pakistan has already made proposals to make South Asia a nuclear weapons free zone. He said that India has been refusing to enter into a dialogue with the regional countries on non-proliferation issue, however, despite U.S. attempts to persuade India to change its mind.

He said nuclear science and technology like any other science is neutral in character and now it was up to the policy planners to use it for the socio-economic uplift or destruction of mankind.

He said the peaceful use of nuclear technology for developing countries is vital in order to have socio-economic development. The federal minister maintained “our aim is to acquire the capability to design, build and operate nuclear power reactors on the basis of maximum self-reliance”.

He said “we strongly that acquisition and development of modern sophisticated technology, including nuclear technology is an essential tool for achieving our goal of self-reliance”. He said it is imperative for developing countries like Pakistan to continue efforts for harnessing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

He said it was the great achievement on the part of Pakistani scientists to have kept the Karachi nuclear power plant KANUPP [Karachi Nuclear Power Project] operating till today even on passage of 18 years when Canada blocked all supplies for it.

He maintained that KANUPP is still going strong and is generating electricity.

Earlier in the first session of the seminar, the editor-in-chief of PAKISTAN OBSERVER said that the seminar will address the issue of nuclear non-proliferation in context of defence capabilities of India and Pakistan.

India has already acquired the status of a mini super-power with world recognised nuclear capabilities, however. “She is today a potent danger to all neighbouring countries particularly Pakistan,” while Pakistan has no option but to develop its own dependable defence capabilities.

He praised President Ghulam Ishaq Khan for steadfastly upholding Pakistan's nuclear programme.

Dr. S.M. Koreshi expressed concern over the growing India-Israel-U.S. nexus and said that it was aimed against the Muslims. He also deliberated at length on the Indians massive militarisation programme and said that these are aimed at a grandiose hegemony plan from Madagascar to the northern tip of Australia.

He also expressed concern over U.S. acknowledgement of Indian claims over the Indian ocean and referred to the increased frequency of visits of American military officials to India.

Major-General (Retd) Rao Farman Ali said that India's expansionist nature needs no further proofs. He said that

it seems that India had agreed to become an agent of U.S. in the region while Israel is doing the same job in its region.

He said the world information media is a powerful weapon in the hands of the West and they are making its full use in launching a campaign against Pakistan's nuclear programme.

### **Sharif Speaks of Lasting Nuclear-Free Region**

*BK3107060792 Islamabad Radio Pakistan Network in Urdu 0200 GMT 31 Jul 92*

[Text] Prime Minister Mohammad Nawaz Sharif has said the establishment of a just, nondiscriminatory and lasting nuclear nonproliferation regime in South Asia will break new grounds in all aspects of bilateral relations. In a message to a national seminar on nuclear nonproliferation and regional approach being held in Islamabad today, Mohammad Nawaz Sharif said a positive response by India will strengthen the process of dialogue and cooperation, removing distrust and suspicion. He said Pakistan is committed to nuclear nonproliferation. He referred to various proposals made by Pakistan to India, the latest of which was about convening a five-nation conference for consultations on the nuclear issue. The proposal was accepted by the United States, Russia and China, but India's reaction was not positive.

The prime minister said the threat to international peace and stability lies largely in regional tensions and disorders. The removal of the sources of these tensions through negotiations is an essential prerequisite for laying a foundation of lasting peace, stability and progress in the world.

### **China Provides Nuclear Plant Under Agreement**

#### **Editorial Praises Delivery**

*92AS1256X Karachi JANG in Urdu 29 Jun 92 p 3*

[Editorial: "Delivery of Chinese Nuclear Plant"]

[Text] The Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency has approved a Chinese-Pakistani agreement, according to which China is to provide Pakistan with a 300,000-kilowatt nuclear power plant. According to this agreement, Pakistan must use the power plant imported from China, as well as other nuclear fuels, for peaceful purposes. In addition, it is to open its plant for international monitoring. When Pakistan agreed with China to purchase this nuclear power plant, it clearly hinted that it would use the plant to remove the country's energy shortage. In this context, it would be willing to accept all kinds of international safeguards. However, the Jewish and Hindu lobby spread unfounded rumors about this deal and paved the way for anti-Pakistan propaganda. But Pakistan stood firm on its principles of truth, and now the Internal Atomic Energy Agency has approved the agreement.

This has removed the negative propaganda of our enemies and, at the same time, proved that Pakistan was right. We expect that Pakistan will take advantage of this success and will start negotiations with other countries with more confidence in order to fight our nation's energy shortage. We also hope that it will keep in mind the plans to build nuclear power plants locally, because this will allow Pakistan to reduce its dependency on other countries. One day, it will be able to achieve independence in the area of energy production.

### **Work on Plant Begins**

*BK3107074392 Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST in English 31 Jul 92 p 1*

[Text] Islamabad—In spite of intense Western lobbying to scuttle Sino-Pakistan nuclear deal, work on the China-supplied 300 megawatt power plant has already begun.

About 1500 Chinese nuclear engineers and technicians have arrived and have already put in place the infrastructure for support services.

The power plant is being located on one of the half-dozen sites originally selected for the nuclear plants that would have come on stream by now if the French had not backed out from its commitment to supply Pakistan with three reprocessing plants. The site at Chashma has already passed soil and seismic tests.

The start of work on the nuclear power plant also indicates that Western pressures to enforce embargoes against China for supplying nuclear technology in certain areas of higher sophistication have failed.

Islamabad has made a down payment amounting to some 27 million dollars to China and the rest, which is relatively low compared to prices quoted by Western vendors, will be made in due time, but the exact amount that is to be paid is not known though it is said to be between 200 and 300 million dollars.

After in-depth consultations spread over years China agreed early this year to supply Pakistan with the nuclear power plant under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) approved safeguards and bilateral understanding on peaceful use of this light water reactor.

The plant is patterned on the China's first indigenous Qinshan nuclear power plant, which has already achieved 75 percent of its rated power output. It is expected to attain full power in August.

Munir Ahmad Khan, former chairman of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, visited the Qinshan power plant early this month and found that the plant has undergone very rigorous commissioning tests and is not likely to have teething troubles unlike the indigenous Indian plants that hit snags, often endangering safety.

For the plant, to be completed in five years, core fuel will be supplied by China and later on Pakistan and China will decide on the replenishment and regular fuel supply.

Pakistan has achieved the capability to enrich uranium to the desired degree but under the agreement core load has to be supplied by China, according to international practice.

Chashma power plant is the second nuclear power plant being set up in Pakistan. The first, Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KNUPP) was supplied by Canada in mid-sixties.

Meanwhile, the future of the 900-MW nuclear plant promised by French President Francois Mitterand remains uncertain. Paris is now more reluctant also for the reason that it is once again under tremendous U.S. pressure to deny nuclear technology to Pakistan.

Though the French authorities blame disagreement on the price for the said plant, the fact remains that France which has now signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty knows that Pakistan cannot meet its requirement for application of fullscope safeguards.

#### **Paper Calls For Renewed Nuclear Research**

*BK0308073492 Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English  
3 Aug 92 p 6*

[Editorial: "Nuclear Rollback—Out of the Question"]

[Text] Thinking in Pakistan on the modus operandi of the country's nuclear research and development programme is that a unilateral rollback does not now mean exclusively in comparison with India's perceptions on the subject. There is no doubt that India's nuclear capability is far superior to that alleged to have been developed by this country. It is also no secret that our relations with that country have been far from amicable since the two countries attained independent status from British rule. As such, regardless of the unreasonable attitude adopted against our nuclear programme by the United States and discontinuation of arms and economic aid to Pakistan at the clamouring of hawks in the U.S. Congress and Senate, it is imperative that we not only go ahead with our nuclear programme but step up our efforts in the research and development programme thereof. Without doubt we are justified in building a

credible defence against an openly hostile immediate neighbour, India, but the threat from that quarter is now of a secondary nature. In terms of pure terminology, India could be termed as Pakistan's enemy number two but it is Israel which has always been the main enemy.

The Zionist entity, with its paranoid enmity towards the Muslim world, is the one whose nuclear development has to be contained. More so since it remains a largely unrecognised country as against India which is a sovereign state in its own right. It boggles the mind to think that the Zionist entity can divert a shipload of nuclear ingredients to its own shores by an act of naked piracy on the high seas without a murmur from its mentor, the United States. On the other hand, the same superpower has made it a matter of international foreign policy to place as many hurdles as it can in the way of Pakistan's peaceful nuclear programme. Additionally, the U.S. has gone out of its way to encourage not only a constant buildup of conventional arms by the Zionist entity but shut both eyes to its efforts in amassing a formidable array of nuclear weapons. U.S. peace efforts in the Middle East are provenly not aimed at securing justice for the Palestinians or curtailing Israel's depredations elsewhere in the region but at securing recognition for its Jewish protege from as many Arab and other Muslim states as possible.

It is now quite long since U.S. economic and military aid to Pakistan was arbitrarily stopped yet we have managed to exist. In that respect, the stoppage has not deterred us from pursuing our peaceful nuclear goals and there is no reason why any similar consideration should do so in future. Pakistan and all other countries of the Muslim World have to be on constant guard against Israel for the simple reason that the track record of the Zionist entity in respect of total disregard for international boundaries speaks for itself. In view of this, nothing can be put beyond an entity whose leaders speak with two tongues. If international diplomacy means keeping other countries in a state of constant uncertainty, then Israel is a past master at the art. All the more reason, then, that Pakistan discard any ideas of any sort of a rollback in its nuclear programme. On the contrary, the imperative is to put in renewed research and development towards its successful implementation.



**Strategic Missile Commander on Nuclear Ownership**

*LD0308190292 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 0415 GMT 3 Aug 92*

[Interview with Colonel General Igor Dmitriyevich Sergeyev, first deputy commander in chief of the Strategic Missile Forces, by correspondent Tatyana Chemodanova; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Chemodanova] Igor Dmitriyevich, the issue of nuclear-free status is a matter of great concern for world public opinion on the whole, and I am not overstating it. It is still unclear how this issue is going to be solved, however. What is the current state of the issue of the unity of missile forces within the strategic forces?

[Sergeyev] This question is worrying both the world public, the newcomer states [novoye zarubezhye], and Russia itself, for this will determine future developments to a great degree. On the positive side, the following can be pointed out at the moment. The co-participants, that is co-owners of the nuclear arms—Kazakhstan and Byelarus—have defined, I believe, their position and taken the appropriate decision, or are about to take one. They have already routinely agreed on all documents. On the whole, the centrifugal trends that used to be prominent until now have given way to some signs of centripetal force.

Both Kazakhstan and Byelarus will agree, I think, that they should implement the Lisbon accords in the near future and ask to take, or take under their jurisdiction those units of strategic missile forces that will be temporarily located on their territories.

[Chemodanova] Igor Dmitriyevich, you have mentioned centripetal tendencies in the Commonwealth. Does Ukraine have the same tendency?

[Sergeyev] One cannot probably say that the same tendency can be observed where Ukraine is concerned, though it is to be desired, naturally. At present, I believe, Ukraine has not yet defined its positions and are remaining the same as before. That is, administrative management has been introduced in Ukraine and is being implemented in the missile units located on its territory. However, in the future our Ukrainian friends may take the same path.

[Chemodanova] In your view, is there a way out of this situation which is somewhat entangled?

[Sergeyev] The tendencies that have emerged and the actions undertaken by Byelarus, and those that Kazakhstan is going to take in the near future, lead me to believe that wisdom will take the upper hand; that the same tendencies will come into our relationships with our other partners. Soon, I think, Ukraine may define its stand as well.

**Russia, U.S. Reach Accord on Stockpiled CW**

*LD3107223092 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1710 GMT 31 Jul 92*

[Commentary by Vladislav Kozyakov]

[Text] Russia and the United States signed a cooperation agreement in Washington on Thursday to destroy the existing stockpile of chemical weapons. Commentary by Vladislav Kozyakov:

The deal follows an agreement that Moscow and Washington signed two years ago on halting the production and eliminating the existing chemical stockpiles. Work is due to be finalized later next month on an international chemical ban which may come into force already next year. Under yesterday's deal struck at the Defense Department, the United States will help Russia destroy its chemical stockpile by allocating \$25 million to this end.

The appropriate contract will be awarded to an American firm on a competitive basis. Such a company is expected to come up with projects for the weapons' destruction, including a feasibility plan of reconverting a Russian chemical plant engaged in the manufacture of toxic agents into a weapons construction [as heard] facility.

One of the overriding priorities is to determine how to dispose best of large stocks of toxic agents such as lewisite and mustard gas, causing most concern by the environmentalists. Much of these was produced back in the 1940's and has to be destroyed locally.

The American company is also expected to supply incinerators, automation, and the equipment for monitoring the process of destruction and the state of the environment.

A Russian official, Anatoliy Kuntsevich, who signed the Washington deal on behalf of this country, says that the United States is the only country possessing such equipment. Russian and U.S. experts will work together at all stages of the weapons destruction, and a team of Russian specialists is due to visit U.S. installations to watch the process there.

The agreement is part of the Russian Government's program for the elimination of chemical weapons, with parliament instructing the cabinet to submit its draft by 15 September. Russian legislators approved a resolution speaking of the need to prepare laws and earmarked funds to meet the country's obligations for the destruction of chemical weapons. Russia faces a daunting job of getting rid of a total 40 million tons of toxic agents at the cost of 100 billion rubles or \$800 million at the current exchange rate. Although the U.S. aid looks too small, it can certainly be of help to the ailing Russian economy. More importantly, the two countries once again join forces in one another's practical venture to the benefit of mankind.

The destruction of the existing stockpile of chemical weapons is of [as heard] the best guarantee that neither the Russians nor the Americans nor the people of other countries will ever face the nightmare of troubles linked with the use or storage of this barbaric type of weapons.

**Russian Foreign Ministry on ABM Treaty**

*OW3107140492 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1331 GMT 31 Jul 92*

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Russian foreign ministry believes that the ABM treaty can become an integral part of the global anti-missile defences the idea of which is now under discussion by Russian and US experts, the deputy in charge of the ministry's department for control over military technologies, Sergey Chuvakhin, told DP [Diplomatic Panorama] commenting on the recent meeting in Washington by Russian and American experts within the framework of the International Security Council.

He said some of the assertions made there that the ABM treaty should be reviewed on the grounds of being an obstacle to the implementation of the global anti-missile defences were inconsistent.

The Russian diplomat said the global project was in essence a new collective security system, and its multinational character, and hence its openness to other countries was one of its fundamental principles. The Russian side believes that in the view of the strategic balance of forces worldwide, the ABM treaty must be kept intact while working on the basic concepts of the global anti-missile defences.

The new project's priority element must include a well-defined system of objective assessment of what is a real threat and possible counter-measure in each separate case.

In other words, the extent of threat must be defined and classified first before any coherent steps are taken to remove it. The diplomat said the Russian and American sides shared understanding on that issue recognising the need for the creation of an international missile attack warning centre.

Chuvakhin said the package of diplomatic and political measures for averting possible missile strikes had not exhausted itself yet although recognising that "there may be the need for the creation of certain types of anti-missile defences in future".

**Russia's Nazarkin on Strategic Arms Reduction**

*LD3107161692 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
1435 GMT 31 Jul 92*

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Sergey Postanogov]

[Text] Moscow July 31 TASS—The radical change in relations between Russia and the United States has made it possible to speed up the reduction of strategic offensive weapons, head of the Russian Foreign Ministry's Department on Disarmament Yuriy Nazarkin told ITAR-TASS today.

A year ago, on July 31, 1991, in Moscow the former Soviet Union and the United States signed the treaty on limitation and reduction of strategic offensive weapons, that provides for the reduction of about 30 percent of strategic nuclear carriers.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union created some additional difficulties in the fulfilment of the treaty, said Nazarkin. The main one is the achievement of agreements with former Soviet republics on whose territories the nuclear weapons are stored.

The complicated task was solved during a meeting of representatives of Russia, Byelarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and the United States, when the treaty on strategic offensive weapons was made a five-side document.

Speaking on the Russian president's U.S. visit, Nazarkin noted the importance of the Washington political agreement between George Bush and Boris Yeltsin to be the basis for a new bilateral treaty between Russia and the United States.

The document provides for a two-stage reduction of armaments. The first stage envisages the reduction of the overall level of military loads to a figure not exceeding for each side 3,800-4,250 units, 1,200 units for intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple warheads, as well as other measures.

The second stages to be completed by the year of 2003, envisages the reduction of the overall level of military loads to 3,000-3,500 units for each side, as well as the complete elimination of nuclear charges on ballistic missiles with multiple warheads.

"I hope the political agreement between the two presidents will soon become a bilateral treaty, and the disarmament process will actively go on," Nazarkin said in conclusion.

**Russia, Japan Cooperate on Nuclear-Powered Ships**

*LD2907093592 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
0720 GMT 29 Jul 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Aleksandr Kopnov]

[Text] Tokyo July 29 TASS—Russia and Japan have adopted a joint programme of cooperation in the area of running nuclear power ships. The Japanese Nuclear Energy Institute has begun to implement the programme by sending Japanese specialists to Russia and conducting joint work on board of Russian nuclear power ice-breakers.

According Kyodo Tsushin [name as received], a delegation from the Japanese Research Centre will travel to Moscow in September to specify aspects of further cooperation.

Proceeding for the assumption that in the early 21st century, nuclear-powered vessels will be used widely throughout the world, Japan finds it most important to range links with Russia, a country which has amassed huge experience in the area, according to a Japanese institute official.

The first contacts were established the two countries after Japanese State Commission last January decided to "scrap" the first national nuclear-powered ship Mutsu built in 1972. Major faults were discovered in its energy unit already during the very first tests. As a result, the ship remained moored for almost twenty years. About two years ago, an attempt was made at "reviving" the Mutsu. After large-scale repair works, the vessel worth nearly 100 billion yen underwent a number of tests, as a result of which it was decided to "write it off" for safety reasons.

As the Japanese Nuclear Energy Research Institute has no alternative plans for building similar ships, it decided to restart by familiarising its specialists with Russian experience in the area. Bilateral talks in June led to an agreement in principle to send two to three Japanese engineers to work on board Russian nuclear-powered ships operating in the Arctic Ocean.

It is also planned to begin joint research to investigate what terms of service of nuclear-powered vessels are safe. With this in mind, the reactor of the first Soviet nuclear-powered ship "Lenin" which was built in 1959 and plied the seas for thirty years. The project promises unique data on the fatigue of the materials and dependability of the design.

In the future, Kyodo Tsushin says, it is not ruled out that Japan and Russia will jointly run Russian nuclear-powered ships on the sea-route from between Japan and Europe via Russian Arctic Seas.

#### **Russia, UK Sign Nonproliferation Agreement**

*PM2907145592 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
29 Jul 92 Morning Edition p 5*

[Report by Aleksandr Krivopalov: "Russian Defense Minister Studies British Experience"]

[Text] London—Before returning to Russia Army General P.S. Grachev, Russian defense minister, signed a joint statement with British Defense Secretary M. Rifkind. This document makes provision for cooperation between the two countries' armed forces.

Above all they intend to help strengthen and promote international agreements to cut back armies and arms and reduce them to a minimum level sufficient for defense.

The intention is also to take further steps to avert the proliferation of mass-destruction weapons, including nuclear weapons. Russia and the United Kingdom also want to cooperate in ensuring the security of those weapons to be destroyed.

The joint statement also envisages continuing the exchange of opinions on control of the armed forces in conditions of democracy as well as cooperation in retraining and finding employment for the servicemen being discharged. In a public statement P.S. Grachev indicated that British experience of service on a contract basis is of great interest.

The ministers also took a step forward in an undertaking that is totally new for us. They agreed on an exchange of students from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces and the British Royal College of Defense Studies.

Military professionals who had gathered to meet the army general at the Royal United Services Institute listened with interest to what he had to say.

#### **Russia, France Sign Space Research Project**

*OW2907131892 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1230 GMT 29 Jul 92*

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The agreement on cooperation in science and engineering between Russia and France is the first document of this kind signed in the entire history of bilateral relations. It opens a wide field of activity for the two countries' scientists, the French Minister for Science and Space Research Hubert Curien told newsmen in Moscow on Tuesday on the eve of signing the agreement.

In answer to a question from DP's [Diplomatic panorama] correspondent H. Curien said that French scientists and industrialists intend to take part in a program for converting Russian defence facilities. According to him, the French view as the most sensible joint activity in the framework of the International Science and Technology Center whose major task is to convert Russia's nuclear defence plants into producers of civilian products.

On the Russian side the agreement was signed by Boris Saltykov, minister of Science, Higher Education and Technical Policy.

At his news conference the French minister said that in the framework of the document a general agreement was signed on cooperation between France's National Center for Space Research and Russia's Space Agency. It provides, apart from the Russian-French space flight that began on Monday, for one more joint orbital mission.

With reference to France's commitments the minister explained that his country will make a financial contribution to cover expenses connected with space missions;

subsequently it will place extensive orders with Russian plants belonging to this industry.

He also mentioned a special research fund to be established for these needs at the initiative of President Francois Mitterrand with the participation of the USA, Germany and different international organizations.

According to what DP learned at the French Embassy from Councillor Philipp Etienne who is in charge of cultural and scientific affairs, the agreement on cooperation provides for establishing direct contacts between research centers in the two countries.

According to him, it will serve as a base for settling disputes in the area of legislation on patents and intellectual property.

He also said that France is willing to give aid in training young scientists and employ Russian researchers who lost jobs as a result of transition to free market.

According to the Councillor, civilized and duly formulated relations between countries will help to halt emigration from Russia and the brain drain resulting from it.

France, the diplomat said, is interested in developing cooperation with Russia in the area of exact sciences, particularly space physics, as well as in agronomy and health service.

### **Russia, Ukraine Sign Black Sea Fleet Accord**

#### **Yeltsin Addresses News Conference**

*LD0308165792 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1546 GMT 3 Aug 92*

[By ITAR-TASS special correspondent Rostislav Gertsev]

[Text] Mukhalatka, 3 August—Weighty, politically strong, and balanced—this is how Russian President Boris Yeltsin described the agreement on the Black Sea Fleet signed in Mukhalatka today.

Speaking at a news conference at the end of the meeting, Boris Yeltsin stated that the presidents have managed to find a "joint approach corresponding to the historical traditions and future interests of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples." He noted that Russia and the Ukraine are two large independent states, both of which influence politics in Europe, and are actively entering the world political arena; therefore "they should implement a common policy."

Ukraine President Leonid Kravchuk described the agreement that has been signed as "politically sound and appropriate to the situation." He said that the decision should "reassure the peoples of Russia, Ukraine, and Crimea, and the officers of the Black Sea Fleet." He noted that in signing the agreement, the sides were guided by the accords reached in Dagomys, by the

neighborly relations between Russia and Ukraine, and by their common interests in the Black Sea and Europe. Asked by journalists about the possibility of Ukraine joining the nuclear club, Leonid Kravchuk replied that control of nuclear arms remains with the unified command, while Ukraine, which so far still has access to such weapons, has a responsibility to see they are not used. The Black Sea, he continued, should remain a zone of peace and cooperation, in accordance with the agreement signed in Istanbul, and hence it will have a non-nuclear status.

The presidents of Russia and Ukraine also examined the basic principles for a full-scale treaty between the two states. The foreign policy departments of the two countries have been instructed to finalize work on the treaty so that it can be signed at the next meeting in Moscow.

During their meeting in Mukhalatka, the foreign ministers of Russia and Ukraine signed an agreement on resolution of disputes concerning the former property of USSR foreign missions, and also signed a document on visa-free entry and exit between Russia and Ukraine.

#### **Joint Command Noted**

*LD0308161192 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1442 GMT 3 Aug 92*

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Rostislav Gertsev]

[Text] Mukhalatka, Ukraine, August 3 TASS—Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk signed an agreement on the Black Sea Fleet in Yalta, Crimea, on Monday.

Under the agreement, the Russian fleet will withdraw from under CIS control to form a Ukrainian-Russian fleet under joint command. The fleet commander will be appointed and dismissed only with consent of the Russian and Ukrainian presidents.

#### **Agreement Called 'Well-Balanced'**

*LD0308171292 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1556 GMT 3 Aug 92*

[By ITAR-TASS special correspondent Rostislav Gertsev]

[Text] Mukhalatka, Ukraine, August 3 TASS—Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk reached an agreement on the Black Sea Fleet in Yalta on Monday, moving closer towards ending the lingering dispute.

Under the agreement, the Black Sea Fleet will be under joint Russian-Ukrainian command.

Yeltsin and Kravchuk described the accord as a well-balanced and politically strong agreement meeting the urgency of the situation.

Kravchuk expressed hope the agreement should "calm down the people of Russia, Ukraine and Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet officers."

Kravchuk said all nuclear weapons deployed in Ukraine will remain under control of the CIS Joint Military Command, while Ukraine will bear the responsibility for their non-use and full elimination.

Yeltsin and Kravchuk also discussed a bilateral friendship pact and ordered their foreign ministers to work out a final draft to be signed during their next meeting in Moscow.

Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and his Ukrainian counterpart Anatoliy Zlenko signed an agreement on the settlement of property disputes over the property of the Soviet Union in foreign countries and a protocol on open borders between the two states.

**Russian General Warns Against More N-Arms Cuts**  
*MK0108133092 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA*  
*in Russian 1 Aug 92 p 1*

[Report by Pavel Felgengauer under the "Army" rubric: "Military Expect Intervention by the West. Grim Prospects for Russian Foreign and Defense Policy"]

[Text] At its second session on 3 July the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (a nonstate organization) discussed the ideas in a Council report entitled "A Strategy for Russia." Colonel General Mikhail Kolesnikov, first deputy chief of the Russian Federation [armed forces] General Staff, was invited to the session and delivered a report on Russia's military doctrine.

The real threat of world nuclear war hour by hour no longer exists, Kolesnikov believes, but in all other respects Russia's military-political position could not be worse. The USSR's collapse destabilized the situation in Eurasia: "There is a real danger that the process of sovereignization will follow the "Yugoslav precedent." The intensification of armed conflicts between former Soviet republics could lead to direct intervention [vmeshatelstvo] by the West (NATO forces), including intervention "on the pretext of ensuring 'international control' over the nuclear potential." "The emergence in place of the USSR or a new center of strength, of Russia first and foremost as a potential rival to these powers, does not accord with the long-term interests of the United States, the NATO bloc as a whole, or Japan." The problem is not confined, moreover, to the West: Threats to Russia's security also exist to the south.

At the same time, the old (Soviet) army has disintegrated, and the commands which remain under Russian banners have lost much of their combat readiness, notably as a result of "inadequately considered disarmament initiatives."

Russia's economic position is lamentable, and the prospect of buying a new generation of sophisticated weaponry for the army in the next 10-20 years is more than dim. This will be so even if we manage to keep the military-technical scientific and design development work of the best design organizations in the famous domestic military-industrial complex at a minimum tolerable standard.

Under these conditions the Russian General Staff is striving primarily to preserve the backbone of the army and the navy—the officer corps, around which a new army can be "grown." Also to preserve the combat-capable structures of the existing armed forces.

No unified view on the new Russian army yet exists, however. Not even among specialists. There is no agreement as to the nature of the future Russian army's rank and file personnel: Should they be volunteers, or predominantly conscripts? Most professional soldiers insist that the draft should be preserved in some form. "Civilian" specialists on military-strategic questions would like to see a Russian army entirely professional, on the American or British model.

Nor is the future role of Russia's nuclear potential clear. The officially proclaimed aim is rapid and complete nuclear disarmament. But the actual state of affairs is causing more and more serious specialists (both "military" and "civilian") to openly acknowledge that further nuclear disarmament would be disastrous for Russia. A situation could emerge in the very near future whereby precisely the nuclear missile potential constitutes a real factor deterring Russia's break-up and the loss of national sovereignty, moreover by comparatively peaceful and bloodless means.

Similar views were expressed at the session by members of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy.

**Chemical Weapons Ban Convention Described**  
*PM0308153392 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA*  
*in Russian 30 Jul 92 p 3*

[Report by Mikhail Zheglov: "Chemical Weapons Finally Banned"]

[Text] Representatives of the 39 countries party to the Disarmament Conference have once again assembled in Geneva following the summer recess. They will discuss the draft convention on a global chemical weapons ban.

In accordance with the draft convention the acquisition, development, production, sale, and use of chemical weapons is universally prohibited. What is more, not only all stocks of this kind of mass-destruction weapon but also any existing enterprises producing them should be destroyed within 10 years after the document comes into force. The convention makes provision for the monitoring [slezeniye] of national chemical industry installations and for regular inspections with a view to preventing chemical weapons production. Provision is

also made for measures to ensure the effective monitoring of possible violations, including the inspection of installations on demand. In the latter case, countries will be obliged to provide foreign observers with access to installations suspected of producing chemical weapons.

The following element is also interesting. A state party to the convention, if subjected to an attack involving the use of chemical weapons, does not have the right to use these weapons to repulse the aggression even if it still has stocks of such weapons at the time in question. Nor can it retain its reserve stocks of war gas until all countries with chemical weapons subscribe to the convention.

The working group operating within the framework of the conference expects the draft convention to be ratified by 7 August in order to give the UN Secretariat time to decide the size of the text, determine whether it conforms with legal norms, and translate it. Following these purely technical procedures, a vote at the UN General Assembly session to be held this fall in New York awaits the convention. If it is adopted it will be open for signature late this year or early next year in Paris. The document will come into force once it has been ratified by 65 states.

To date, according to Stephen Ledogar, U.S. delegation head at the Geneva conference, two-thirds of the conference participants are willing to subscribe to the convention. They include Russia, the United States, Canada, all West and East European countries, and a number of states in Latin America. As for the rest, they still have time to make up their minds.

### Problems of Destroying CW Stockpiles

LD3107113192 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service  
in English 0610 GMT 31 Jul 92

[Text] [Announcer] Near the port of Kambarka in the Udmurt Autonomous Republic in central Russia there are reported to be big stockpiles of the deadly chemical warfare agent Lewisite. Disposing of the stockpile will be quite a problem but our science correspondent Boris Belitskiy has heard of some new ideas on the score. Boris, what did you hear?

[Belitskiy] First of all let me explain that Lewisite is a vesicant. That is an agent that forms blisters on the skin, just like the notorious mustard gas of World War One II fame. But, unlike mustard gas, Lewisite has never been used in action. As for its stockpile in the Udmurt Republic, that's doomed to stay put for at least four or five years. The reason is that there is as yet no method for destroying Lewisite. It's therefore expected that a contest will be announced for the development of the safest and least expensive method of its destruction.

In the meantime, a group of scientists in Russia have proposed one such method which seems to be quite promising, however.

[Announcer] How general is this problem Boris?

[Belitskiy] Well, in the Commonwealth of Independent States there is a total of nearly 40,000t [tonnes] of poison gases and something like 30,000 in the United States. This is a huge amount and the problem of destroying them is now quite a formidable problem. The method of destroying them that has been proposed, quite unexpectedly, originates with a group of scientists in Arzamas-16.

[Announcer] And what is that?

[Belitskiy] That's a formerly hush hush town which is the home of Russia's Research Institute of Experimental Physics [as heard] which has been concerned with developing atomic and hydrogen bombs. Its deputy scientific head, Dr. Yuriy Trubnev [as heard] has just proposed that these very bombs be used to destroy chemical warfare agents. Here he is, explaining his idea.

[Trubnev, in Russian with superimposed English translation] Trubnev says they're studying the problem of destroying chemical warfare agents, highly toxic wastes of the chemical industry and even nuclear warheads by nuclear explosions. To be sure the public is today highly allergic to underground nuclear explosions but it's simply uninformed in Trubnev's view of the fact that such explosions can be conducted in an ecologically clean manner, provided appropriate geological structures are chosen and the blasts are conducted at an adequate depth.

Trubnev says that he and his colleagues could demonstrate that chemical warfare agents can be destroyed in this way without dismantling. Other destruction technologies require that chemical weapons be dismantled and the poisonous chemicals be extracted from them. What's more the destruction of chemical weapons has to be not just 99 percent effective but 99.9999 etc. percent effective. A nuclear blast achieves just that. It turns the chemicals into plasma, after which only simple substances can be formed. Existing technologies on the other hand produce other substances and they too have to be buried.

Trubnev sees this dilemma. Either we keep storing the chemical warfare agents, running the risk of a chemical Chernobyl, or else, at a fraction of the cost, destroy them by means of an underground nuclear explosion. Back to Trubnev.

Trubnev considers the technology sufficiently developed for a demonstration under international supervision. It's important he feels to convince the world public of this. Physicists are after all part of society and they cannot live in society and feel entirely independent of it.

### Russian Prospects for Technology Exports

924P0145A Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I  
MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian  
No 6, Jun 92 pp 20-29

[Article by Viktor Yuryevich Presnyakov, candidate of economic sciences and head of a sector of the VNI

(All-Russian Scientific Research Institute) of Foreign Economic Relations under the Russian Federation Ministry of Economics and Finance, and Vyacheslav Vyacheslavovich Sokolov, candidate of economic sciences and scientific associate of the VNII of Foreign Economic Relations under the Russian Federation Ministry of Economics and Finance: "Export Control Abroad Today and Tomorrow"]

[Text] The export control system established by Western countries under the leadership of the United States in 1949 and perfected over the past decade was adapted to the geopolitical situation of the "cold war."<sup>1</sup> What is the outlook for it today, when the world situation has fundamentally changed? The question which concerns members of the former USSR most of all is whether they can count on the United States and its allies to lift all the export restrictions quickly. This article attempts to trace the development of views on the objectives and tasks of export control in the Western countries after the cessation of global confrontation and to predict its evolution in the 1990's.

#### New Approaches and Principles

Until recently, exports from Western countries to the former USSR were restricted both for national security and foreign policy reasons.<sup>2</sup> The purpose of these restrictions was to ensure NATO's superiority over the Warsaw Pact Organization (WPO). With the shift from confrontation to partnership lately, the Western states are working out a new approach which makes it possible to combine achievement of this objective with an expansion of trade and other forms of cooperation. Reform of the control system, based on replacement of the export restrictions on individual commodities with regulation of the deliveries of the most important technologies ("relative control"), was developed even before the end of the "cold war." Nevertheless, it proved to be extremely convenient for members of the COCOM [Coordinating Committee for Export Control] under the new conditions, enabling them to expand the range of commodities removed from control and maintain the Western states' scientific and technical leadership.

The USSR and the Western countries gradually began feeling about for common ground in export control questions. The problem of nonproliferation of mass destruction weapons (MDW) and the means of their delivery became the most important point of contact.

In 1990, Professor (J.) Hoffman of Harvard University (United States) defined the most important tasks in this area as follows: 1) "establishment of a new security system in Europe, which in all probability will be a combination between a significantly transformed NATO, where the United States will not be playing the dominant role, and the West European defense system and organization created by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe"; 2) conclusion of an agreement among the principal suppliers of weapons and advanced technology to sharply limit the sale of these

commodities, reinforce the conditions for nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and develop regional systems for arms limitation and settlement of conflicts; and 3) reaching an understanding on "the redistribution of power (which still remains in the hands of the United States) between the principal players in the international financial and economic organizations—the United States and the European Community."<sup>3</sup> In our view, these continue to be important tasks even after the disintegration of the USSR.

However, most of the predictions made by American political scientists by mid-1991 were based on the prospect of the Soviet Union being maintained as a single strong power which is gradually transformed into a partner of the United States, but remains a rival on a global scale at the same time. Most of the authors did not seriously consider the idea of independent Soviet republics, except for Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

On this basis, a commission of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, in its report on export control published in February 1991, singled out the following objectives of policy in this area: to restrain access by Soviet military circles to American products and technologies which can directly and substantially contribute to arms development; to monitor the access by certain states to products which may directly assist in the development of advanced weapons systems; to limit the access to nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile technologies and "know-how" by countries suspected of attempts to take possession of these types of weapons; and to bring about the introduction of sanctions on a multilateral basis for violation of international agreements or standards of behavior in the area under consideration.<sup>4</sup>

However, the situation changed abruptly. On one hand, the events of August 1991 eliminated the real possibility of renewed confrontation between East and West, and on the other hand, they provided impetus for the final disintegration of the USSR and the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) on its territory. The previous assessments of the world situation had become outdated.

W. Kaufman, former adviser to the U.S. secretary of defense, stated: "As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, all the 'scenarios' which apply to it are collapsing."<sup>5</sup> A report by the Heritage Foundation [Fond naslediya] under the title General Principles for Providing Assistance to the Soviet Union" disseminated in September 1991 called for abstention from steps which would strengthen the central government and contribute to the transition to "a free association of successor states with a free market." At the same time, American specialists realize that it is unrealistic not to take the states emerging in the territory of the USSR into account in defining the new world order. In H. Kissinger's opinion, it "will be defined by the six major states—the United States, Europe, China, Japan, the ones that will emerge

in place of the Soviet Union, and possibly India, as well as a multitude of smaller countries."<sup>6</sup>

The transitional nature of the present era seriously impedes the development of a long-term strategic line, especially with respect to such specific questions as export control. Legally, the West was conducting its affairs with a single state—the USSR—right up to its abolition in December 1991. The rules of trade which apply to it are being maintained in effect even now. The outlines of the future Commonwealth still have not assumed their final shape. As a result, neither the customs borders of this formation, nor the nature of relationships among its members, nor their relationships with other former members of the union have been defined (the system of bilateral agreements which was concluded obviously is provisional in nature and will be replaced later on by new bilateral or multilateral agreements).

Accordingly, the status of the former Soviet republics as subjects of international law and world economic relationships continues to be not entirely clear. As a result, the current situation abounds in legal fictions, and it is not possible at present to accurately define the country which is to be the object of export control in the future.

Let us briefly remind you of the United States' general strategy on questions of aid. This strategy has been aimed at linking aid to states in the former "socialist camp" with their movement toward liberal democracy and a market economy. The more firmly a state is established on this path, the less "strategic risk" it presents for the West, in the viewpoint of the United States and the COCOM. In all probability, this approach will be maintained over the forthcoming decade.

#### The Basic Directions of Control

The European states have reached a consensus with respect to the advisability of continuing the activity of the North Atlantic Alliance. Former members of the Warsaw Pact are establishing official relations with them. We can expect that NATO will continue to play a key role over the next decade in the defense policy of developed states in the West. For this reason, (J.) Hoffman's assumption that the new structure of European security will be based on symbiosis between NATO and the CSCE appears to be completely valid. The West's multilateral export control has pursued the primary objective of reinforcing NATO's military and political efforts. For this reason, we may say with sufficient certainty that the system that has been developed will continue to function in the future.

At the same time, the North Atlantic Alliance no longer has a clearly defined enemy, which the Warsaw Pact Organization was before. Will certain countries which are part of the updated European security system<sup>7</sup> retain the restrictions on exports to other member-states for security and foreign policy reasons under these conditions?

There are sufficient grounds for an affirmative answer to this question. Every large state has a ramified system of export organizations for various military, political, economic, and other reasons. The restrictions are minimal for friendly states, but they are increased to the extent that relations have cooled.

Even trade between Western countries themselves is not devoid of such obstacles. For example, different conditions have been established in the United States for exports to the three countries of Belgium, Switzerland, and Austria. In Great Britain, the commodities (technologies) which are subject to restriction are divided into those prohibited for exportation to any country; those prohibited for exportation in all cases except when they fall under EC regulation; those prohibited for sale in all states except Commonwealth countries; those authorized for export only to 75 states; and those authorized for exportation to all states except those monitored by the COCOM.

Consequently, the problem is not whether any restrictions on exports to former Warsaw Pact countries will be retained (they will be continued, of course), but whether the restrictions in effect will exceed the threshold beyond which they may be considered discriminatory, as before, and whether they will impede the integration of these countries into the world economic community. Restrictions of this type apply to a country recorded in a list of states to which exports are subject to control for security or foreign policy reasons. One of the most important reasons for introducing export restrictions is the possibility that the commodity (technology) delivered may be used by a potential enemy for military purposes. This reason is close to disappearance with respect to members of the CSCE. Others remain, however.

First of all, control "for security reasons" is not limited exclusively to the urge to keep the powerful military machine of opposing countries on starvation rations. It is also aimed at avoiding the emergence of potential threats to Western states and international stability in general.<sup>8</sup> In certain countries, such as Germany, the exportation of weapons and military equipment to areas of instability is forbidden by law. Meanwhile, the territory of the former USSR has been turned into just such a region of instability. Most Western prognosticators found themselves in a state of confusion after the collapse of the scenarios for development that had been worked out. Once again they are beginning to regard the former USSR as a potential source of danger, not as the result of deliberate efforts by the existing regime, but as the result of its territory being turned into a zone of conflict and the increased probability that the nuclear weapons which are available may be used.

Under these conditions, deliveries of technologies which may be used for military purposes are being viewed with caution, as before. In the opinion of the American expert L. Welch, the strategic armed forces of the United States should take into account that they will have to deal with "third powers" that have nuclear or other weapons of



mass destruction at their disposal, from which we can expect "less rational" conduct.

The events taking place in the territory of the former USSR, as well as the emergence of new states which represent a danger for the West, often are perceived as a potential threat (in this case, they recall Russia's imperial history).<sup>9</sup> For this reason, leading figures in the West are devoting particular attention to the arguments of intelligence services, which seek to ensure the West's technological superiority, including for the convenience of their own activity. Thus, deliveries to the former USSR of advanced telecommunications equipment continue to be prohibited on the grounds that modernization of government communications networks would make it harder for American intelligence to listen to them.

Another reason for maintaining the control is to avoid outflows of strategic commodities and technologies and their transfer to other countries which are considered as potentially threatening to international stability. The problem of nonproliferation of mass destruction weapons and the means for their delivery, as well as the restriction of trade in advanced weapons, is extremely critical today. The transfer of advanced technologies with military applications to certain countries cannot help but give rise to serious concern as well. For this reason, the restrictions on exports to a specific country often are introduced not so much in order to prevent its use of controlled commodities and technologies as to prevent their re-exportation. The West required a guarantee against it from countries in Eastern Europe (Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland) as a prerequisite for liberalization of export conditions. In this case, reference was made primarily to re-exportation to the Soviet Union.

In order to resolve questions of this sort with republics of the former USSR, in all probability, they will refer to prevention of their re-exportation to states in "the Third World" which are hostile to the West. The example of Iraq convincingly demonstrates that the danger from certain aggressive regimes' acquisition of advanced means of waging war is very real. Exports to such countries as Vietnam, Iran, the DPRK, Cuba, and Libya obviously will be subject to stricter control (this list may be changed, depending on political events).

It has not been ruled out that China also will become an object of stricter export control, compared with the former Soviet republics. In this connection, the assumptions by American specialists about the possible onset of "a Brezhnev era" in the PRC, characterized by rejection of reforms and "the acquisition by any means of advanced technology, especially for military purposes,"<sup>10</sup> appears to be symptomatic. However, China is clearly not experiencing the level of restrictions which existed for the Soviet Union, because the Western powers do not perceive it as the geostrategic enemy that the USSR was.

Meanwhile, the West does not have confidence in the ability of the states emerging in place of the USSR to effectively control exports, including for re-exportation, as well as the exportation of their own technologies which have military applications. Export restrictions may be precautionary measures as well as a means of pressure. Members of NATO and Japan want to be certain that Russia and other republics of the former union are capable of organizing effective control over the movement of imported technology to prevent it from getting to the states where the supplier country would not have sold it.

Aside from the military-strategic and diplomatic considerations, export control may serve the objectives of maintaining a country's political and economic influence.<sup>11</sup> Inasmuch as many questions of economic relationships are resolved "as a package," it has not been ruled out that removal of export restrictions may be made dependent on the outcome of debates on listed problems which is favorable for Western capital. Export restrictions may also be used as a means of pressure in resolving one specific political question or another.

Finally, economic interest may be an effective method of maintaining control over the movement of commodities and technologies in a number of areas. Even in relations among the Western countries themselves, multilateral export control has long been used as a means of competition. The conflicts which exist between the world's two technological leaders—the United States and Japan—are especially acute. There is no question that the United States still surpasses all its allies in the level of its technological development. However, the trend toward diminution of this superiority is gradually gaining momentum.

According to American estimates, out of the 12 most important fields of scientific and technical progress, the United States is ahead of Japan in six fields, the two countries are roughly at the same level in one field, and the United States is behind in five fields. At the same time, there is the prospect that the United States may be behind in most fields. Until now, the United States' superiority has enabled American companies to trade in advanced technologies relatively freely, although the weakening in their positions is driving influential circles in the country toward "technonationalism."

American experts are recommending that the Federal Government make use of different opportunities to actively promote the development of technology which is vitally important to the nation's competitiveness. As retired Admiral B.P. Inman and D. Burton, deputy chairman of the Council on Competitiveness, point out, "national security can no longer be considered exclusively in military terms." Economic security and industrial competitiveness are vitally important as well. In fact, it is hard to say where military interests end and economic problems begin where technology is concerned.

The authors indicate that more attention has to be given in forming policy to problems such as the activity of technologically intensive sectors, the strength of the production base, the use of key technologies in the different sectors of industry, and the condition of the country's technical infrastructure. The authors also singled out the principal technologies whose development is under intensive discussion in the United States—consumer electronics, semiconductors, superconductors, the "FSX" fighter, and high-resolution television.<sup>12</sup>

Japan's policy with respect to exportation of technology is noted for its extreme inflexibility. Thus, national firms have refused to supply Americans with new plans for supercomputers by selling them in the U.S. domestic market. Business circles in the new industrial countries complain about the difficulty of obtaining advanced technologies in Japan. Development of the "FSX" fighter led to a clash between "technonationalists" in the United States and Japan. But they eventually managed to reach an agreement.

One of the examples of the interrelationship of export control and competitiveness is the 18-month ban imposed by the Japanese Government in November 1991 on the exportation of output by the company producing ("JA") aviation components. This was because of its illegal military shipments to Iran. The U.S. Department of Defense attempted to obtain deliveries for them as an exception, but the Japanese decided to impose sanctions in the full amount. In the specialists' opinion, an incident such as this attests to the growing dependence of American industry on Japan's technology.

So the increased role of technology in competition is leading to stratification of world trade on two "levels": on the lower level (approved commodities and technologies), active liberalization of trade is under way; on the upper level (advanced technologies), various obstacles to free exchange are being maintained. All this is leading to an increase in industrial espionage. According to a statement by (C. Silbergian), general director of France's main administration of external security [sic], one-quarter of the administration's work is devoted to economic intelligence.<sup>13</sup>

Under these conditions, it is convenient to make use of export control to cut off access to needed technology "for security reasons" to those sectors of an importing country which may present serious competition to producers of the supplying country in the future. The multipurpose nature of advanced technology facilitates such a policy by making it possible to consider practically all technological innovations as having a "dual application." In principle, the use of other pretexts for this purpose (protection of the environment, for example) has not been ruled out, either.

So in our view, the system of export control is being maintained with respect to the states which have emerged in place of the former Soviet Union for the following reasons:

- 1. their instability and insufficient predictability of further development, including the possible use of nuclear weapons;
- 2. lack of confidence in their ability to guarantee control over re-exportation and to prevent imported technologies from falling into the hands of undesirable addressees;
- 3. the desire to use export control to influence their economic development and to limit the opportunity for competition with leading Western producers of advanced output; and
- 4. the intention to apply export control to resolve certain political or economic problems.

### The Differentiated Approach

All these factors apply to the countries of Eastern Europe as well. However, they have their own specific characteristics. Czechoslovakia and Poland, which continue to be subject to COCOM export control, have received preferential conditions in comparison with other countries which were formerly Warsaw Pact members. They have established national systems of export control to prevent the outflow of imported technologies to destinations that are unacceptable to the suppliers. In December 1991, the United States announced that the ban on arms exports to these countries had been lifted.

The West's favorable attitude toward them may be explained by the fact that the effect of the first two factors we cited is much weaker there than in the former USSR or the Balkans. The governments of Czechoslovakia and Poland, by pursuing a course toward liberal democracy and a market economy despite their serious political crises, are controlling their situation on the whole. Their own systems of export control are considered adequate by Western experts to accomplish the tasks assigned. Of course, complete confidence with respect to either of the two factors is not present here, either. Nevertheless, the West made the choice to encourage these states by liberalizing the export conditions.

It may be predicted with a high degree of probability that these countries will disappear from the list of states to which exports are controlled by COCOM members for security reasons by the year 2000. However, it depends on the last two factors how quickly this takes place. The removal of export restrictions will be held up by lobbyists for those sectors of industry which feel threatened by the development of East European competitors. At the state level, concessions in the area of exports will evidently be exchanged for concessions in other areas (it has not been ruled out that even after the COCOM restrictions are completely removed, some other loopholes will be left to hold up the exportation of advanced technologies).

Members of the CIS and certain other states (primarily those in the Balkans) are in a more difficult situation. All

four of the factors come into full play here. In addition, it is much easier for lobbyists of the military-industrial complex to maintain the illusion of the "historical threat to the West" with respect to Russia than the other states that are subjected to export controls. For this reason, we can expect that these states will remain longer on the list of countries to which exports are subjected to "above-normal" restrictions. The inclusion of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland in the multilateral system of export regulation creates additional difficulties for the states in our Commonwealth in developing foreign economic ties.

Exports to the states with "practicing socialism" and "Third World" countries which demonstrate aggressive intentions or are suspected of them will be subjected to stricter control through the COCOM and other channels. Countries of the world are being differentiated before our eyes in accordance with the extent of their access to the latest technology developed in COCOM member-states. This differentiation is also being made among countries of the former "socialist camp." And they can get to a higher level in the hierarchy of technology recipients only after they have guaranteed that the controlled technology will not be transferred to countries at a lower level. A similar process has been identified among the developing states as well (countries on the upper level here are those which have joined the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and are not suspected of attempts to acquire other types of mass destruction weapons and means for their delivery, as well as those which have concluded agreements with the United States and the COCOM on participation in the Western system of export control).

It is possible that such differentiation among technology recipients will lead to the emergence of a "multilevel" system of export control. The technologically advanced Western states united in the COCOM may form the nucleus of this system. The countries receiving the technology will be broken down into groups in accordance with the degree of potential military danger which they present, in the COCOM members' opinion, and their ability to prevent reexportation of the technology to undesirable addresses. Countries of the former "socialist camp" would be located in this pyramid in the following manner: Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland at the top, and Cuba, the DPRK, and Vietnam at the bottom (if their current regimes are retained); the rest of the countries would be located between them.

What place will the states of the former USSR occupy in this arrangement, and which pole will they be closer to? Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, which became members of the world community with full rights in 1991, are likely candidates for preferential export conditions. It has not been ruled out that they will acquire the same status in the multilateral export control system as Czechoslovakia and Poland.

As far as the remaining 12 republics are concerned, there may be two alternatives. Under the first one, the policy

of export control will be implemented with respect to the entire territory of the Commonwealth when the CIS is developed on the basis of a common economic space and political cooperation. In the second alternative, when conflicts increase within the CIS, the centrifugal processes are intensified, and Commonwealth members become more economically isolated, the Western countries will decide on export policy for one state or another individually. It has not been ruled out that the former republics of the USSR may establish control over technological exchange with each other.

A great deal depends on which of the alternatives the Western partners consider more suitable for themselves. For a long period of time they have supported retention of a unified USSR—for considerations of strategic stability, as well as to guarantee fulfillment of international economic commitments. However, after being convinced of the force of centrifugal tendencies in the territory of the former union, the Western powers reoriented themselves to cooperation with individual republics.

It is possible that they will come to the conclusion later on that integration of the individual republics and regions into world economic relationships is more in line with their interests than formation of a unified economic space in the ruble zone. In a case such as this, export control will be turned into an instrument for separating members of the economic community. In this approach, certain states will be offered preferential conditions for importing advanced technologies and Western aid in modernizing their national economy. The organization of control over exports to neighboring countries of the CIS, which are considered to represent potential danger to the West as before, may become a condition for receiving such preferences. This means transferring the "differentiated approach" tactic used by the COCOM at the United States' initiative in 1990-1991 to the controlled countries in the territory of the former Soviet Union.

\* \* \*

On the whole, the formation of export conditions for members of the CIS will depend, in our view, on the nature and form of interrelationships among the states which have emerged in the territory of the union; the abilities to resolve conflicts with each other and internally; the relationships of these states with the United States and other NATO and COCOM members and progress made in disarmament; strict adherence by the former Soviet republics to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and their ability to prevent transfer of the latest technologies (primarily Western technologies, but domestic ones as well) adaptable for developing mass destruction weapons and their means of delivery to states which attempt to develop such weapons; and on the extent of apprehension by Western countries about competition from these republics in world markets.

American specialists have repeatedly raised the problem of organizing cooperation between the United States and the USSR to prevent the spread of mass destruction weapons. In particular, a report on the problem of export control by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences points to the special importance of such cooperation. A very radical suggestion was advanced by M. (Brement), an associate at the American National Defense University: come to an agreement on the restriction, and subsequently a complete ban, on the transfer to "Third World" states of the latest nuclear and laser technologies, aircraft undetectable by radar ("Stealth"), weapons with precision control and guidance [oruzhiya tochnogo navedeniya], submarines, and so forth.<sup>14</sup>

The collapse of the USSR gave rise to concern in Western countries that the conditions for nonproliferation of mass destruction weapons might become impaired even further. Reduction of the Soviet military-industrial complex, in the opinion of Western experts, may lead to the point that domestic specialists in the development of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons may sell their knowledge on the foreign market. According to reports in the foreign press, some countries have already attempted to hire our specialists in nuclear technology.<sup>15</sup> At the same time, the Western states themselves seek to make use of the disintegration of the Soviet VPK [military-industrial complex] to replenish their own arsenals. In the view of the American press, a group attached to the U.S. National Security Council is preparing proposals to revise legislation banning purchase in the USSR of products of the aerospace industry and the launching of satellites made with American technology on Soviet booster rockets.<sup>16</sup>

When Soviet nuclear reactors, satellites, space stations, rocket engines, and so forth are sold, the United States intends to buy everything to prevent this technology from falling into the hands of Germany and Japan. At the same time, plans have been and continue to be advanced to include the Soviet Union, and now Russia, in the SDI [strategic defense initiative] program. French Minister of Defense P. Joxe also has not ruled out the possibility of cooperation in the military use of space technology. Certain officials in the United States oppose such arrangements, however, maintaining that encouraging highly complex developments in the former USSR by purchasing them from the American side does not meet the national interests.

So competition among the Western countries is under way for the possible use of the advanced technologies developed in the USSR. For this reason, the states in the Commonwealth are faced with two tasks: ensuring that commitments on nonproliferation of mass destruction weapons are met to prevent the difficult situation in the CIS from being used for the illegal replenishment of someone's arsenals; and regulating the technological exchange with Western countries without allowing it to be turned into a one-way street. Attempts may be made by the Western states to intensify the conflicts among subjects of the Commonwealth in order to acquire the

maximum number of advanced technologies on the most favorable terms. All this requires prompt and thorough study of the legal aspects of the question of the property belonging to subjects of the former union, as well as the possibility of reaching agreement on joint actions in such transactions.

It is necessary to select the plans for transactions which support the space and other advanced technology programs financially without implying they are simply a transfer of the latest technologies to a buyer. The establishment of joint ventures, as well as participation in joint projects, appears promising. At the same time, we have to bring about a coordinated removal of the restrictions on technology exports from both sides.<sup>17</sup>

#### Footnotes

1. For more details, see V. Presnyakov and V. Sokolov, "The USSR in the West's Export Control System," *MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNAROD-NYYE OTNOSHENIYA* No 6, 1991, pp 25-37.
2. The last restrictions on exports to the Soviet Union for foreign policy reasons were lifted by the United States in January 1990.
3. *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*, Fall 1990, p 15.
4. "Finding Common Ground. U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment" (Executive Summary), Washington, 1991, p 4.
5. *THE NEW YORK TIMES*, 5 Sep 1991.
6. *THE WASHINGTON POST*, 3 Dec 1991.
7. Without predicting the details of this system, which will be established in the next two or three years, in our view, we are assuming that it will take shape on the basis of the CSCE mechanism and that NATO structures will play an important role in maintaining it.
8. Under U.S. laws, these motives apply to foreign policy considerations, although American experts correctly point to their inseparable link to security considerations.
9. Even the war in Yugoslavia may lead to the emergence of states which threaten international stability, in the opinion of some authors (See *THE WASHINGTON POST*, 29 Sep 1991).
10. *WALL STREET JOURNAL*, 21 and 22 Jun 1991.
11. Thus, L. Eagleburger, the U.S. first deputy secretary of state [sic], speaking at a conference of the Export-Import Bank of the United States in May 1991, called upon the countries of Eastern Europe to remove the limits on foreign property (both on the ownership of real estate and shares in joint-stock capital), as well as to limit responsibility for damage to the environment. Such "specific barriers to foreign investments," in his opinion, interfere with the development of national

enterprises, because foreign capital can transfer technologies and managerial knowledge and help to restructure industry so as not to burden the economy of these countries with debts."

12. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Spring 1990, pp 116-117.

13. QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS, 19 Jun 1991.

14. FOREIGN POLICY, Fall 1991, pp 112-113.

15. THE WASHINGTON POST, 28 Nov 1991.

16. SPACE NEWS, 28 Oct 1991.

17. Under the conditions of our country's extremely severe economic crisis, concern about an equivalent exchange of technologies may seem unwarranted. However, refusal to develop advanced technology sectors would not only throw our country into the "Third World," but deprive it of extensive export markets.

#### **Russian Experts Assess Nuclear Power Station**

*LD3107215492 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya  
Ostankino Television First Program Network  
in Russian 1700 GMT 31 Jul 92*

[Video report by S. Sergeyev from Chelyabinsk oblast—from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] This is how the construction site of the Uzhno-Uralsk nuclear electric power station [AES] looks today. Tall weeds everywhere and foundation ditches for the first and second power generating units are filled with water. We did not see a single worker or a single construction mechanism, therefore, rumors about reanimating a frozen nuclear installation turned out to be only rumors and the truth is as follows: A regular authoritative commission of experts set up by the Russian Economics Ministry has finished its work and reached the conclusion on the station project.

[V.I. Fetisov, director, Industrial Association "Mayak", and Russian people's deputy] According to state experts, there are no obstacles to the construction of the Uzhno-Uralsk nuclear station at present. The commission of experts noted that the project decision to use a fast neutron reactor was very successful and that new prospects on the implementation of a closed nuclear fuel cycle are opened here, but to build or not to build the nuclear station—the decision should be made by the Russian Government, certainly, with the participation of the oblast soviet.

#### **Atomic Submarines To Leave Sovetskaya Gavan**

*LD3107090792 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya  
Ostankino Television First Program Network  
in Russian 1100 GMT 30 Jul 92*

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] Two brief reports on the topic of conversion. Atomic submarines who have done their bit are ready to

leave Sovetskaya Gavan. This was reported today by Yuriy Suvalov, commander of a Navy unit. Moreover for the first time he reported it not just to his seniors but also to the administration of Sovetskaya Gavan. A submarine basis of the Pacific Fleet has been working here, on the coast of the Tatar strait, for a long time. Once written off, submarines would still remain in the bay which used to cause anxiety among the local authorities and the public, however. Atomic submarines will be taken apart in the workshops of a specialized enterprise.

#### **Feature on Weapons Trade, Discarded Submarines**

*OW3107005992 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1817 GMT 31 Jul 92*

[From the "Trade & Investment" feature: "Trade in Weapons"; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text]

#### **Russia To License Weapons Components Exports To Other CIS Countries**

Russian defence enterprises now have to obtain a license if they want to supply components used in arms production to the rest of the Commonwealth. Similarly, licensing will now apply to purchases of weapons components coming the other way under existing production cooperation arrangements and contracts. These requirements are set in the government's ruling dated as of July 24, which is designed to stem supplies of weapons to crisis areas in the Commonwealth and ensure that Russia honor its international commitments related to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Licenses for exports of arms components will be granted to defence enterprises by Russia's Ministry for External Economic Ties. Applications should be made using standard application forms. Applicants are held responsible for providing truthful information to substantiate their applications for licenses.

#### **Russian Government Allows Sale of Licensing for Production of Ammunition**

The Russian Government has permitted the state scientific manufacturing firm Bazalt (part of the defense complex) to sell foreign customers "know-how" and licenses for the production of ammunition.

The government resolution signed by Vice Prime Minister Georgiy Khizha gives firms the right to sell ammunition produced by them to foreign customers beginning this year through the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations. The government also permitted Bazalt to develop new types of ammunition for government orders and foreign clients, considering the interests of the ministry, and to hold consultations for foreign specialists and show samples of ammunition.

### Russia To Use Discarded Military Ships

The Russian Government will accelerate the utilization of military ships and submarines, mainly nuclear, removed from the navy, and turn them over for experienced technological dismantling by shipbuilding and repair plants in the republic.

The Russian State Committee on Government Property (Goskomimushchestvo) was ordered to transfer the written-off ships and submarines to the republic's firms which will conduct the dismantling without government funding.

The firms will use new environmentally clean methods of dismantling and drawing byproducts from the refinement of titanium alloys and other metals. The firms will also call in commercial firms and foreign investors for the project.

The scrap and products received from the dismantling of the ships and submarines can be sold by quotas or licensing set by the Ministry of Industry and the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations. Those products which may not be exported according to Russian law are excluded.

The firms involved in dismantling the ships are exempt from import-export duties. All hard currency profits remaining after the firm has sold the mandatory 50

at market price, will be transferred to a special account in the Russian Finance Ministry and will be used to import equipment for the firms.

The government will also grant shipbuilding and repair firms involved in the project special tax breaks on profits from the sale of products received from dismantling of the first submarines and ships (one unit per factory).

**Table 1. List of ships and submarines removed from the navy to be dismantled by shipbuilding and repair factories.**

Firm	type of vessel	quantity
Northern Machine Building Plant	nuclear submarine	3
Sever Manufacturing Amalgamation	long range nuclear submarine	4
Zvezda Shipbuilding Plant (Far East)	long range nuclear submarine	4
Shipbuilding plant (Khabarovsk)	anti-submarine ship	1
Yantar—Baltic shipbuilding plant	guided missile ship	1
"Nerpa" ship repair plant	nuclear submarine	2

### Utilization of Scrapped Warships Stepped Up

OW2907145592 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1336 GMT 29 Jul 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Russia's government intends to speed up the utilization of warships and submarines, nuclear-powered

in the first place, signed off by the navy. They can be used for developing new technologies for cutting up ships and thus employing the republic's ship-building and repairing capacities.

Russia's Committee for State Property will hand over the vessels to the warves which will carry out the work on the self-financing principle without drawing funds from the budget.

New ecologically safe methods should be evolved yielding titanium alloys and other metals. Private producers and foreign investors could be attracted to the works.

The metal scrap and by-products obtained from utilized ships can be sold under certain quotas and licenses issued by the Ministries of Industry and of Foreign Economic Relations. Exception should be made for goods banned for export under Russia's law.

The enterprises utilizing vessels will be exempt from import and export duties. They will be obliged to sell 50

of their export earnings at the current rate and charge the rest to the special account in the Finance Ministry to be used for importing equipment for them.

The government will offer them initial tax allowances (one vessel utilized by each plant engaged in the business).

### Komi Region Views Draft Law on Nuclear Testing

LD2907100992 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
0853 GMT 29 Jul 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Viktor Makarov]

[Text] Syktyvkar July 29 TASS—The government of the Komi Autonomous Republic in the north of Russia discussed on Tuesday a draft law of the Russian Government "on measures for nuclear underground tests on the central testing-site of the Russian Federation."

The government suggested that heads of regional administrations make their proposals on the issue to be subsequently considered by the republic's parliament which will pass a concrete decision on the problem.

Under the Russian president's decree of February 27, 1992, the nuclear testing site in Novaya Zemlya was called the central testing-site of the Russian Federation.

The Russian Ministry for Nuclear Power Engineering jointly with other organisations concerned worked out a draft law of the Russian Government. The draft law will be coordinated with administrations of the regions adjoining the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago, including the Arkhangelsk Region, the Komi Republic, Nenetsk and Yamal-Nenetsk Autonomous Regions.

Last year the Komi Parliament came out against nuclear tests in the republic. A Congress of Komi People's Deputies adopted a similar decision.

At the end of June, 1992, after the draft law of the Russian Government arrived, the republic's Council of Ministers set up a special commission to look into the matter.

The results of the commission's work were reported on Tuesday to the republic's government by Anatoliy Taskayev, director of the Komi Biology Research Institute.

Taskayev pointed out that the commission had not arrived at a unanimous conclusion. Valeriy Markov, acting in compliance with the decision of the Congress of Komi People's Deputies, insists on complete cessation of nuclear tests in Novaya Zemlya.

A number of other members of the commission hold the view that nuclear tests should be stopped simultaneously on all testing-sites of the world, or at least in the United States and the Commonwealth of Independent States. In the meantime, they think it is possible to continue underground nuclear tests in Novaya Zemlya provided certain conditions and demands are observed.

Their conclusions are based on the results of experiments which proved that underground nuclear tests previously staged in Novaya Zemlya and the territory of Komi for geological purposes, have not polluted the environment.

The commission suggested that a number of amendments be made in the draft law, including the enhancing of control over the radiation and ecological situation, providing funds for the implementation of the project "priority tasks to ensure radioactive safety and social protection of the Komi population", providing medical

institutions of regions adjoining Novaya Zemlya with modern equipment for diagnostics and treatment, and implementing the "Pechora" project.

It was also suggested to include in the draft law a clause on the rehabilitation of the central testing-site and adjoining territories, which have been previously affected by underground and atmospheric nuclear explosions.

### **Byelarus To Sell Only Non-Nuclear Weapons**

*LD2907094192 Moscow Radio Rossii Network  
in Russian 0900 GMT 29 Jul 92*

[Text] Byelarus will sell its excess arms. This was stated by Mikhail Myasnikovich, first deputy chairman of the republic's Council of Ministers, in an interview with an INTERFAX correspondent. He thereby unambiguously ruled out the possibility of any kind of trade deals in which nuclear arms are involved.

### **Pakistani Professor To Head Baku Science Institute**

*NC0308124092 Baku TURAN in English 1226 GMT  
1 Aug 92*

[Text] Baku, 01/08/92 TURAN: The international scientific-research institute for physics, technology and ecology was opened in Baku.

The institute has been set up on the initiative of the well-known Pakistanian scientist, director of the International Center for Theoretical Physics, nobel prize Laureate, Professor Abdus Salam.

The institute will be financed through the international center.

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